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I. INTRODUCTION
In his ambitious and beautifully realized new book, Edward Purcell
reminds his readers that only recently have federal courts scholars begun to
consider the extent to which their subject is the product of distinctive
historical developments.' One of the many gifts of this important work is its
vivid demonstration of how much scholars gain by studying jurisdictional
issues in historical context, at least when history is treated with the richness
and breadth of purpose that characterize Brandeis and the Progressive
Constitution.
Purcell describes his book as a work of history, not of legal analysis.
But it is history, and historical method, that should be of tremendous
interest to legal scholars. This rich, nuanced, and meticulously researched
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work uses Erie,2 a decision that has transformed, Zelig-like, to personify
each jurisprudential age, as a prism through which to view the evolving
concept of federalism, and, more generally, the cyclical erosion and
creation of doctrinal meaning. It weaves together intellectual, political,
social, and legal history to tell the compelling story of the changing social
dynamics that engendered and then constantly reinvented the Erie doctrine.
In modeling this use of history, Purcell shows, implicitly and explicitly, the
limits of the current doctrinal method for understanding the evolution and
proper role of the federal courts. For, as Purcell says, "[w]ithout constant
reference to changing social dynamics and consequences, students of
procedure can scarcely know what they are talking about. Whatever social
purposes abstract analyses might be designed to serve, historical changes
continually refit them to new and unexpected ends." 3 Placing jurisdictional
doctrine in historical context illuminates the social and political influences
that shape and reshape the contours of the federal judicial power and our
evolving notions of federalism.
Conventional legal doctrinal method strips away acknowledgment of
these forces and recasts principles like federalism in more abstract and
formalized terms. It portrays the development of law as linear, logical, and
transcending political and social variables. As I argue, the impulse to cast
doctrinal development in these formal terms has numerous sources,
including the perceived need to satisfy the requisites of the rule of law.
When federalism is portrayed as an abstract notion, unaffected by changing
political conditions or the changing nature of the institutions themselves,
that portrayal gives the seductive appearance of advancing the goals of
consistency, predictability, and reason. The legal process school, with its
focus on discerning neutral jurisdictional principles, identified the field of
federal courts with this effort to articulate a federalism transcending the
vagaries of history and politics. In attempting to impart a systemic
coherence to the field, and to federalism as its central organizing principle,
the legal process approach advocated an insularity that sought to exclude a
whole host of influences and contingencies-political, cultural, historical,
and practical.'
2. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), rev'g Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1
(1842). Swift " had expanded the power of the national courts to create a 'general' federal common
law independent of the common law of the states." PURCELL, supra note 1, at 1. Erie held that
federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction may not use their independent judgment on the
common law of the state, but must, except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or acts
of Congress, apply the law of the state. In doing so, "it sought to limit [the federal] judicial power
and rebalance the lawmaking structure of American government." Id.
3. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 257.
4. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Late Night Confessions in the Hart and Wechsler Hotel, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 993 (1994); Michael Wells, Naked Politics, Federal Courts Law, and the Canon of
Acceptable Arguments, 47 EMORY L.J. 89 (1998).
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In a variety of legal subject areas, exposure to interdisciplinarity has
both forced and helped legal scholars to identify the hidden assumptions,
nonlegal influences, and value choices underlying legal concepts.' The field
of federal jurisdiction, however, wards off this challenge to its hermeticism
to the extent it defines itself as a closed, autonomous system in which
jurisdictional issues can and should be decided based on their fidelity to
internally defined principles6 like federalism and separation of powers.7
There is a troubling persistence to the assumption that these terms possess
their own normative content,8 or describe stable essences9 that exist in the
real world, yet somehow outside time.'0 There persists an equally strong
conviction that jurisdictional principles should operate independent of the
results to which they lead, the substantive issues to which they are
applied,' or the ideological or emotional commitments of the jurists who
apply them. In short, the exclusion of substantive justice as a proper inquiry
is an essential part of the field's self-definition.
5. See, e.g., PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW AND
LITERATURE 4 (2000); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 60-93,
99(1996).
6. That is, principles that derive their meaning and legitimacy solely from the assumptions of
the system itself, rather than from external sources. For a discussion of these neutral principles,
see infra text accompanying notes 148-173.
7. This statement may be unduly ahistorical in itself. Purcell asserts that the field, as
originally inspired by Brandeis and molded by Frankfurter, was "born of political commitment
and ideological conviction," and should not be equated with what it became after the Second
World War. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 4-5.
8. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991) (finding that principles of
federalism created a strong presumption against applying the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act to state employees, justified by the fact that "[i]n the tension between federal and state power
lies the promise of liberty"); see also Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some
Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 904-05 (1994) (discussing Gregory).
Increasingly, there also has developed a rich body of scholarship debating the possible normative
underpinnings of these concepts and their formal versus functional qualities. See, e.g., DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995) (bibliography); sources cited in Vicki C. Jackson,
Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180,
2213-23 (1998).
9. Such assumptions are limited neither to the field of federal courts nor to law in general, of
course. See, e.g., JEROME KAGAN, THREE SEDUCTIVE IDEAS 67 (1998) (stating that one of the
hardiest preferences is for ideas that "imply stable essences, possess symmetry, and are simple" ).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2000) ("The Constitution
requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local."); see also THOMAS
C. GREY, THE NEW FORMALISM 5-7 (Stanford Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Series, Working
Paper No. 4, 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstractid=200732 (discussing
Christopher Langdell's essentialism, which Grey defines as the belief that a concept delineates the
essence of a species); Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as a Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 201, 211 (1990) (describing a declarative judicial tone that conflates the actual world
with the world represented in the text); Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90
YALE L.J. 1017, 1029 (1981) (discussing the belief that "the function of law is to learn to
recognize.., regimes of spontaneous order already present in social life").
11. Wells, supra note 4, at 89.
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Granted, the concept of neutral jurisdictional principles12 has been
taking increasing heat. It is becoming ever clearer, as legal scholars gain
historical perspective and the benefit of insightful scholarship, 3 that the
legal process school's"4 belief in an abstract and timeless logic of
federalism is itself a product of its time, and is itself based on a choice of
values-albeit a choice that went unacknowledged and undefended. Yet it
is not at all clear that the notion has lost its hold on the field. 5 Certainly, for
reasons complicated by the perceived requisites of the judicial role, the
concept of neutral principles remains an article of faith in judicial opinions.
The more basic question is whether the belief in the existence and efficacy
of neutral principles is separable from the field with which it was created.
That is, if scholars accept the inevitability of value choices, will procedure
be subsumed by substance, or will principles remain to help bound, guide,
and assess the allocation of state and federal power? Or, to state the
question more optimistically, can a broadening awareness and exploration
of the contingencies shaping jurisdictional policy help enrich the field?
This is an opportune and even necessary time to ask these questions.
Our nation is witnessing a radical restructuring of federal-state relations.
The restructuring, often dubbed "The New Federalism," is being
accomplished largely through revitalizing the Tenth Amendment and
establishing a categorical anticommandeering principle, 6 sharply restricting
12. The articulation of the concept of neutral principles is generally credited to Herbert
Wechsler, who argued that the judicial process must be "genuinely principled, resting with
respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite
transcending the immediate result that is achieved." Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 15 (1959).
13. See KALMAN, supra note 5, at ch. 1 and passim; ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSmVISM
IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 113-216 (1998); Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process
Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 601 (1993); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953 (1994); Gary Peller,
Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 571 (1988); Michael Wells,
Busting the Hart & Wechsler Paradigm, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 557 (1995); Michael Wells,
Who's Afraid of Henry Hart?, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 175 (1997); Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story,
102 HARV. L. REv. 688 (1989) (book review).
14. The legal process school takes its name from the seminal work of Henry Hart and Albert
Sacks. Infra note 98. Hart later joined forces with Herbert Wechsler to shape the field of federal
courts, which, as I discuss below, is closely associated with both the legal process methodology
and the concept of neutral principles. For a discussion of the creation of the legal process school,
see infra text accompanying notes 98-112, and for a discussion of the school's philosophy, see
infra text accompanying notes 147-173.
15. E.g., Fallon, supra note 13, at 969 (referring to legal process theory as the reigning
paradigm); Peller, supra note 13, at 571 (claiming that the process approach continues to form
background assumptions for most centrist legal scholars). Contra SEBOK, supra note 13, at 177
(arguing that the reputation of the legal process theory has declined); Duxbury, supra note 13, at
704 (noting that some now dismiss this strain of legal philosophy as "little more than a vision of a
legal utopia" ).
16. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating provisions of the Brady Act).
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the power of Congress to legislate under the Commerce Clause,17 restricting
the power of Congress to legislate under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment,' 8 and greatly expanding state sovereign immunity. 9 Since
1995, the Court has invalidated all or part of twenty-five federal laws, many
on federalism grounds.2° How should the desirability of this emerging
vision of federalism be assessed?
Perhaps, as some have argued, the Supreme Court is illegitimately
imposing its personal vision of federalism on an unwilling nation, Lochner-
like,2' or perhaps we are entering a fourth transformative era of lawmaking
on par with the framing of the Constitution, Reconstruction, and the New
Deal.2" The high-stakes rhetoric employed by both sides reflects a deep
ideological division on the question of what constitutes a proper federalism.
17. E.g., United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (striking down the civil-remedy
portion of the Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
(voiding the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990).
18. E.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down portions of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (extending Boerne's restrictions on Section 5 power).
19. E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that the principle of sovereign
immunity prevents states from being nonconsensually sued in their own courts on federal claims);
Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. 627 (rejecting the constructive waiver theory).
20. Linda Greenhouse, A Turf Battle's Unlikely Victim, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2000, at Al.
21. Invocation of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), is generally shorthand for the
accusation that judges have enacted their personal prejudices into law, although the precise
contours of the epithet are subject to debate. Compare Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 701 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that
Lochner "threatened the Nation's ability to enact social legislation"), with id. at 691 (majority
opinion) (arguing instead that Lochner's distinctive feature "was that it sought to impose a
particular economic philosophy upon the Constitution"). See also Alden, 527 U.S. at 814 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (finding a resemblance between the majority's jurisprudence and Lochner); John E.
Nowak, The Gang of Five and the Second Coming of an Anti-Reconstruction Supreme Court, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1091, 1094 (2000) (arguing that the new sovereign immunity cases
represent "to some extent anti-Federalist... 'philosophy' ... imposed on our country"); Peter M.
Shane, Federalism's "Old Deal": What's Right and Wrong with Conservative Judicial Activism,
45 VILL. L. REV. 201 (2000) (arguing that the new federalism shares many of the worst
characteristics of Lochner-era jurisprudence); David L. Shapiro, The 1999 Trilogy: What Is Good
Federalism?, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 753, 760 (2000) (stating that he "can only hope that this
arrogation of authority will sooner, rather than later, meet the fate of some of its notorious
predecessors"). This view may or may not eventually prove to parallel the conventional story of
the battles between the old Court and the New Deal, which Bruce Ackerman critiques as treating
"the constitutional struggles of the 1930's as if they were the product of an intellectual mistake
made by a handful of judicial conservatives on the Supreme Court." 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 9 (1998); see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 18, 199,
and passim (1993) (addressing misconceptions about Lochner-era constitutional lawmaking);
Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 YALE E.J. 2115, 2117 (1999)
(critiquing the argument that the New Deal was simply a restoration of the previous wisdom of the
Marshall Court).
22. See ACKERMAN, supra note 21 (discussing transformative moments of constitutional
government); see also Shane, supra note 21, at 201 (citing Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. &
State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 892 (4th Cir. 1999) (en bane) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (stating
that federal courts are currently undergoing "[t]his century's third and final era of judicial
activism"), affid sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000)).
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Such an extreme fissure sorely tests the belief in an immanent principle of
federal-state ordering that is based on a national consensus and transcends
political ideology. Long-term branch affinities23 have undergone a
noticeable shift, as conservatives look to the Court for protection and
liberals argue for legislative primacy, calling into question the ideal of an
ahistorical commitment to particular institutional roles.24 Scholars and
dissenting judges accuse the Court of using federalism as a cover for
advancing hidden agendas like antipathy to individual rights in the same
way the Court once used federalism as a cover for the defense of slavery or
laissez-faire capitalism. A concept of federalism that may have appeared
coherent and timeless during more harmonious times is now revealed to be
contested, temporary, and contingent. At such junctures, it is easier to
locate ourselves in the realm of values, politics, and a particular historical
moment,26 and, from that vantage point, to reassess the requisites for a
coherent and principled notion of federalism.
As Purcell notes, judicial opinions "blur, obscure, and then replace
broad and complex historical understandings with formalized doctrines." 27
History expands our understanding of the variables that influence the
evolution of law, and it therefore poses a challenge to our notions of law's
stability and coherence.28 The challenge needs to be taken seriously, as a
signal to reexamine those notions and their continuing viability. How stable
or flexible, how impervious or porous should a principled system be? Is a
principled federalism possible that fails to defend its value choices and
acknowledge its social and political goals? Alternatively, is a principled
23. See PURCELL, supra note 1, at 5 (discussing the "critical role 'branch affinities' played in
the ideological commitments of diverse political partisans to the different branches of
government"). The book argues that "such foundational ideas as federalism, separation of
powers, and the respective constitutional roles of the various branches of government are rooted
largely in expectations concerning the practical consequences that varying allocations of
institutional authority would likely cause" and thus will "shift, fragment, and realign over time."
Id.
24. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, No Federalists Here: Anti-Federalism and Nationalism on the
Rehnquist Court, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 741, 747 (2000) (discussing "Nationalist" dissenters'
accusations of hypocrisy toward the conservative majority and calling them a "double-edged
sword"); Shane, supra note 21; David Cole, Paper Federalists, NATION, June 12, 2000, at 6
(charging conservatives with using the same activist strategies they once decried when liberals
used them).
25. Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV.
1275, 1340 (1999) (critiquing the Court's use of federalism to avoid responsibility for systemic
police brutality); Nowak, supra note 21, at 1113-17; Cole, supra note 24; see also Morrison, 120
S. Ct. at 1768 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court revives a formalist conception of
federalism in order to assert its own conception of a sphere of state autonomy).
26. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v Lopez, 1995 S. CT.
REV. 125, 126-27 (discussing the process by which accepted fictions and conventions cease to be
widely understood and become contested).
27. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 4.
28. See Gordon, supra note 10, at 1021-22; Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Contingency of
the Role of History, 90 YALE L.J. 1057, 1057 (1981).
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federalism possible that more fully takes the influence of these complex
variables into account?
In Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution, Edward Purcell provides
an admirable model for considering these questions. The book is organized
into three major sections. Part I focuses on the Progressive era and the
expansion of federal judicial power. Part II shifts focus to a consideration of
Justice Brandeis and the genesis of the Erie opinion. Part III follows the
evolution of the Erie doctrine and considers it in the larger context of the
nature of historical and legal change. Purcell's concerns are ultimately
about the very nature of a principled jurisprudence. The book's historical
approach affords insight into the choices and tradeoffs implicated in
defining a coherent field and populating it with coherent concepts.
This Review first turns, in Part II, to a discussion of Purcell's historical
account of the age leading up to Erie, the creation of the Erie opinion itself,
and its subsequent doctrinal evolution under rapidly evolving historical
conditions. This Part focuses, in particular, on Purcell's account of the
myriad ways in which political, social, and cultural influences affect the
scope of the federal judicial power over time. It considers the broad
political and social trends, the influence of interest groups-including the
bar-and the ways in which certain highly influential jurists, particularly
Justices David Brewer,29 Felix Frankfurter, and Louis Brandeis, and
Professor Henry Hart, helped shape the evolution of legal doctrine.
Specifically, Section II.A examines the expansion of the federal judicial
power during the late-nineteenth-century era of federalizing commercial
and industrial interests. This Section also focuses on Justice David
Brewer's contribution to the expansion of Swift v. Tyson. Section H.B
focuses on Justice Brandeis, his role in crafting the Erie decision, and the
influences and constraints affecting that role. Section II.C focuses on the
path of the Erie doctrine in the aftermath of the Progressive era, and
particularly on the role of Frankfurter, Hart, and the other expositors of the
doctrine of neutral principles in recasting the significance of Erie and its
conception of federalism. This Part examines these influences in order to
pose the question of whether a greater recognition of these influences, and
the interactions among them, would enrich and improve upon the
conventional ahistorical legal account of the development of doctrine.
Part III considers this question. In Section HI.A, I posit that although
law and history are not entirely congruent in their purposes, history
nevertheless can offer valuable insights into the ingredients of a principled
29. Brewer was a Fuller Court jurist prominently associated with the expansion of the
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which held that while state statutes were
rules of decision binding on federal courts, state judicial decisions were not laws governed by the
Rules of Decision Act and were thus not binding on the federal courts. See infra text
accompanying notes 40-60.
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legal jurisprudence. As Purcell shows, historical context can shed light on
the ways in which, for example, the one true federalism of one era becomes
the discredited formalism of the next. In documenting the changing nature
of American institutions and of -scholars' attitudes toward them, history
reminds observers to approach current claims for timeless verities and
immutable federal-state ordering with caution. Thus, in Section ILI.B, I
examine the still influential defense of value-neutral federalism that
undergirds the doctrine of neutral principles of jurisdictional law. To the
extent the doctrine of neutral principles is premised on the desirability of
excluding nonlegal considerations from judging, it poses a direct challenge
to the argument that historical context can enrich jurisdictional doctrine.
Thus, it is important to understand the historical context in which the
doctrine itself arose. Here I argue that the doctrine was premised on an
undefended and historically contingent belief in the possibility of value-
neutral judging that should have little continuing validity. In Section II.C, I
argue that this misguided belief in the possibility of a value-neutral,
internally coherent body of jurisdictional doctrine has much in common
with the brand of formalism that characterizes the New Federalism of the
Rehnquist Court. This Section offers a critique of this aspect of the New
Federalism, which, I argue, sacrifices concern for substantive justice for a
questionable notion of predictability and coherence. Section I.D argues
that jurisdictional doctrine, and the doctrine of federalism in particular,
would benefit from more explicit recognition of the political and social
values that have always shaped them, and that will inevitably continue to do
so. It argues that a notion of federalism that acknowledges its social,
political, and historical influences holds out the possibility of being more
principled-more flexible, more responsive to changing conditions, more
concerned with substantive justice, less likely to calcify around an illusion
of coherence that has lost its normative hold. It concludes that Purcell is
correct in suggesting that Justice Brandeis offers a model for this type of
jurisprudence.
II. THE STORY OF ERIE: FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO THE
REHNQUIST COURT
The story Edward Purcell sets out to tell, as the title of his book
announces, is about the Progressive Constitution-the rise, fall, or
evolution (depending on one's view) of a regime in which Progressive
values animated constitutional interpretation. This focus explains many of
the choices Purcell makes, and perhaps some of the tensions in the book's
conception as well. It explains, for example, why the book contains very
little discussion of Justice Story, the author of Swift v. Tyson, or his initial
conceptions of Swift's federal common law, and a wealth (indeed, at times a
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surfeit) of detail about Justice Brandeis and his conceptions of the Erie
doctrine. This is not meant to be a story about the origins of Swift v. Tyson
and Swift's demise at the hands of Erie. The story instead begins in the
Progressive era, and focuses on Justice Brandeis as, in most respects, an
exemplar and major architect of Progressive values.30 Similarly, Purcell's
book treats the Erie case as the achievement of one of Brandeis's most
dearly held goals as a judge: overruling a case that, in its operation and
perhaps also its conception, was antithetical to his Progressive conception
of constitutional governance, and replacing that case with a regime that
would better accord with that conception. The book examines the choices
Brandeis made in crafting Erie and the constraints within which he made
these choices. Purcell's book then traces the consequences of those choices
and constraints for a precedent conceived in one era but thrust, almost
immediately, into vastly different political, social, and constitutional
contexts.
Given the central role Purcell accords Justice Brandeis, Purcell's
account of the Progressive Constitution is best understood as an account of
the particular Progressivism of Justice Brandeis. Purcell describes
Brandeis's Progressivism as consisting of intertwined commitments to the
ideals of social justice and efficiency, an antagonism toward corporate
concentration and "bigness" in general, and a belief that the legitimacy of
all institutions derived from their ability to enhance the freedom of
individuals.' In Purcell's complex portrait, Brandeis's commitment to
judicial restraint was an outgrowth of these commitments, a concern for the
justice of each individual case.32 In this portrait, Brandeis's respect for the
constraints of judging coexisted with his conception of substantive justice, a
conception that was infused with his deeply held Progressive values.33
As Purcell tells his readers at the outset, his is a historical and not a
legal analysis, a distinction to which I will return later.' This historical
analysis explains the creation and evolution of the Erie doctrine not as the
linear result of doctrinal logic, but as part of a dynamic pattern of change
and continuity, formation and reformation.35 Purcell's historical approach
30. But see PH1LIPA STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM 2-3 (1993) (discussing
the ways in which Brandeis's Progressivism was unique).
31. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 141-42; see also STRUM, supra note 30, at 2-3. Strum notes
that Brandeis's philosophy went "beyond Progressivism." She argues that unlike most
Progressives, Brandeis did not advocate a level economic playing field, if the leveling of the
playing field required government regulation. He preferred that economic liberty be guarded by
individuals rather than by the state. STRUM, supra note 30, at 8.
32. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 304.
33. Id. at 159.
34. Infra text accompanying notes 121-148.
35. David Hackett Fischer draws on the terminology of THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE
OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962), to describe the series of structural reformations that best
captures the dynamics of historical evolution. DAVID HACKETIT FISCHER, HISTORIANS'
FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT 161-62 (1970).
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places Erie within a broad range of historical, political, and social forces
that provide a richer context for understanding the evolving notions of the
role of law and the nature of constitutional government according to which
the doctrine was shaped and reshaped.
This historical account centers on several themes with important
implications for the development of jurisdictional doctrine, and for the
question of whether jurisdictional doctrine can remain coherent or
principled over time in the face of such influences. The account focuses
first on the social and political forces that drive, at different historical
junctures, the expansion and limitation of the federal judicial power. For
example, Purcell draws on historical developments such as the labor
movement, the New Deal, the Depression, the Second World War, and the
McCarthy era, and on intellectual currents such as Progressivism,36 legal
realism,37 and the legal process school.38 The book illustrates the role of
powerful interest groups, including commercial and labor interests, on
changing conceptions of law. For example, one important contribution of
the book is its treatment of the legal profession as a powerful special-
interest group that consistently sought to shape the law for the enhancement
of its own prestige and well-being, while wearing the mantle of detached
concern for the rule of law and the greater good.
Purcell's book examines the question of how particular political or
ideological groups choose their branch affinities, and, more important for
this historical analysis, the question of how these choices are transformed
into neutral, ahistorical-sounding jurisdictional principles. This historical
treatment provides a valuable perspective on the political and social forces
that, in certain eras, create a powerful incentive toward the federalization of
law. Most valuable for legal scholars, Purcell considers the extent to which
this perspective can inform our understanding of the evolution of the
judicially created concept of federalism.
Finally, Purcell considers the role of powerful individuals, particularly
those jurists in a position to shape the path of the law, and the influences
shaping those individuals. The book focuses not only on Justice Brandeis,
the eponymous hero of the narrative of Progressive constitutionalism, but
36. See PURCELL, supra note 1, at 2 n.*, in which he states his intent to use the term
"Progressive" to refer to:
the ideas, values, and assumptions that characterized many of the reform movements of
the early twentieth century, particularly their widely shared if somewhat varied
commitments to science, expertise, efficiency, popular education, democratic
government, the rights of labor, the limitation of corporate power, and the use of
government to ameliorate the harsh consequences of industrialization.
37. See id. at 218-21. Purcell discusses the prewar legal realists, who, he describes, "had
rejected the idea that courts 'found' law and had insisted that social results constituted the proper
test of a rule's desirability." Id. at 218; see also GREY, supra note 10, at 9 (discussing the legal
realists of 1925 to 1940, including Jerome Frank, Karl Llewellyn, and Max Radin).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 101-110, 157-186.
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on three other powerful and influential thinkers as well. Specifically, it
highlights Justice David Brewer, a major architect of the expansion of Swift
v. Tyson; Justice Felix Frankfurter, in his role as one of the most influential
interpreters of the legacy of Erie and that of Justice Brandeis himself; and
Professor Henry Hart, the prime architect of the field of federal courts.
This focus on individuals in historical context permits Purcell to raise
crucial questions about the proper role of personal values and commitments
in shaping and interpreting the law, and on the evolving historical, social,
and constitutional constraints within which judges work. Focusing on
individuals also allows him to present Erie not as doctrine spawned in a
historical vacuum from previous doctrine, but in light of its "complex
social origins ... [and] purposeful human crafting." 39 By focusing on the
human agency behind Erie, the book fittingly illustrates the fallacy of the
notion of "found law," and provides an extended consideration of all the
ways in which law is made by people with values, political and religious
beliefs, intellectual passions, and emotional commitments. Purcell's
approach allows the reader to ruminate on the nature of those values and
beliefs, the extent to which they are shaped by historical time, and the
circumstances in which they are taken for granted or contested.
Throughout, the book explores crucial questions about the development
of doctrine. It questions the extent to which one jurist's conception can
shape the path of law. It asks whether law can stand apart from the political
and ideological commitments of the jurists who shape that law. And finally,
it inquires: What is the obligation of jurists to ensure the coherence or
stability of doctrine over time, and how should they carry out this
obligation? In this Part, I describe Purcell's approach to these issues.
A. Laying the Foundation for Erie: The Expansion of Federal Power
Purcell's story begins in the final third of the nineteenth century, during
which the increasing nationalization of industrial and commercial interests,
as well as a perceived loss of moral and cultural order in the face of these
radical economic shifts, seemed to point to the need for a more centralized
locus of order and authority. The shift of power from state to nation, and
particularly to the federal judiciary, were important means of advancing
those goals, in the service of which the Supreme Court restructured
jurisdictional law to expand the lower federal courts' ability to deal with
economically important disputes.4° Here, as throughout, Purcell portrays the
39. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 1.
40. For example, expanding pendent federal jurisdiction over state law claims and limiting
the Eleventh Amendment by permitting federal injunctive relief against state actors. Id. at 42-43
(discussing Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)); id. at 321 nn.15-16 (discussing, inter alia, Sier
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 174 (1909)).
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shaping of branch affinities as proceeding according to a complex mixture
of idealism and self-interest, and the accompanying tendency, by both
courts and commentators, to express their defense of those branch affinities
in formal, categorical terms.4' Conservatives, viewing the federal courts as
an effective and powerful guardian for corporate interests and their
expansion, cast them as the embodiment of the ideals of law, reason, and
justice. The organized bar preached the need to preserve the federal courts'
prestige and influence, an outcome that would enhance its own prestige and
influence as well.42
Many Progressives, favoring localism and abhorring "bigness,"
naturally looked askance at the nationalizing tendencies and their
advancement of corporate interests. As the Progressives saw, the increasing
centralization and uniformity of federal law served political ends, ends with
which it was distinctly out of sympathy.43 They fought growing
industrialization and the resultant concentration of power with efforts
toward unionization and labor reform.4" The federal courts thwarted these
Progressive reform campaigns through neutral-appearing doctrinal means,
at the same time consolidating their own power and prestige. They used the
Contract Clause, substantive due process, the Commerce Clause, and the
search for the "true, enduring, and universal" principles of the common
law4" (as enunciated by federal judges) as the judicial tools through which
the judiciary's protectiveness toward national commercial interests and
organized wealth was translated into formal doctrine. Progressives,
unsurprisingly, developed their own set of branch affinities, finding the
legislatures both better equipped, structurally, to ameliorate social
problems, and more open to doing so.46
At this point the book focuses on the first of its pivotal figures, Justice
David J. Brewer, one of the more conservative Justices on the conservative
Fuller Court of the late nineteenth century, and an architect of the
expansion of federal power. The portrait of Justice Brewer raises two
important questions, which I later consider in more detail. The first is the
question of how a judge's ideological framework, and particularly the most
basic unexamined assumptions underlying it, shape the judge's perceptions
of which choices are legitimate, which are nonpolitical, and which are
41. Jd. at 16.
42. The sections on the role of the bar are some of the most interesting in the book because
they offer concrete illustrations of the means by which legal elites shape law, at least in part, to
enhance and preserve their own prestige. At this juncture Purcell provides an insightful
description of the ABA reform proposals of the early twentieth century. Id. at 28-29. Later, he
gives a brilliant exegesis of the ALl proposals of the 1950s. Id. at 273-84.
43. Id. at 37.
44. See STRUM, supra note 30, at 89.
45. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 19.
46. Id. at 12-19.
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foreordained. The second is the question of how particular legal regimes
(and perhaps especially jurisdictional regimes) constrain or enable the
judge's ability to make such choices-and how much they ought to do so.
Justice Brewer, in Purcell's vivid portrait, was a Justice with strong
convictions on a wide range of subjects, including the dangers of labor
unions, legislatures, and the non-Anglo-Saxon races; and the saving power
of Christianity, the Constitution, and the federal courts. Purcell describes
Brewer as a jurist who found a remarkable degree of congruity between his
personal beliefs, his vision of the Constitution, and his view of the power of
the federal judiciary to enforce his own constitutional vision, particularly
his stunningly expansive view of the reach of Article Il. Purcell states that
Brewer equated "God's justice with the law, the law with the courts, and
the federal courts with the salvation of the nation."47 Thus Brewer's
fundamental goal was to ensure that the judiciary could maintain the rule of
the Founders' law and God's justice. He found a powerful ally in the
federal common law, whose reach-with his assistance-had been greatly
expanded since the decision in Swift v. Tyson.4 8 Under Brewer's influence,
according to Purcell, the Fuller Court's brand of federal common law49
allowed Brewer to serve his ideas of right and justice for several reasons:
That brand of federal common law allowed the Court to make rules without
identifying their source or legitimating their creation, to strike down
legislative enactments and replace them with judge-made law, and to
establish federal primacy over the states in areas in which Congress, if not
impeded by the Court, would have preserved state autonomy.50
47. Id. at 63.
48. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
49. Purcell, like Tony Freyer, Morton Horwitz, and Lawrence Lessig, distinguishes the Swift
opinion itself from the vast expansions in its reach and method that came later. See TONY
FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SwiFT & ERiE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 93
(1981); MORTON J. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 245-66
(1977); Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive
Theory, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1785, 1788 (1997). Swift was premised on the notion that federal
courts could, like state courts, interpret state law, at least in the absence of state statutory
interpretations and in a confined set of substantive areas. Later, the notion of interpreting state law
seemed to be subsumed by a less positivist notion of a federal lawmaking power more in line with
the conception of federal law as a brooding omnipresence. At the same time, the types of state
common-law cases in which federal power applied grew substantially. See Lessig, supra, at 1792-
95; see also Charles A. Heckman, Uniform Commercial Law in the Nineteenth Century Federal
Courts: The Decline and Abuse of the Swift Doctrine, 27 EMORY L.J. 45 (1978) (analyzing the
evolution of the Swift doctrine from 1842 until Erie in 1938).
50. Since federal primacy was key in Brewer's hierarchy of values, he was able to harmonize
results that were apparently quite inconsistent but that served to expand federal power. For
example, Brewer held insurance law to be local and thus not part of interstate commerce for
purposes of the Commerce Clause, thereby placing it off-limits to Congress. At the same time,
however, he held insurance law to be general and thus within Swift's definition of the reach of the
federal common law, thereby placing it within the federal judicial power. PURCELL, supra note 1,
at 56.
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Purcell's discussion seems intended, especially in light of the book's
later treatment of Justice Brandeis, to illustrate how thoroughly the personal
values of an ideologically committed but not particularly reflective jurist
can shape and indeed permeate his jurisprudence. If, as it appears, Purcell
evinces more than a hint of authorial disapproval here, it raises the
question: Is it because Purcell believes Brewer's personal values unduly
influenced his jurisprudence, that they were objectionable values, or that
there were inherent faults in the substance of the jurisprudence itself?
Interestingly, Purcell implies that the questions may not be separable in this
case. For him, the heart of the problem appears to be that the essence of
Brewer's jurisprudence was that it created so many opportunities for the
unbridled imposition of the values of individual judges, impervious to
correction by the democratically elected legislature. 1
The treatment of Justice Brewer highlights the tension, inherent in
Purcell's approach, between the focus on the role of influential individuals
in shaping law and the portrayal of law's evolution as the product of a
complex mixture of broad social and political forces. This approach
demands of the author a difficult balancing act between attributing events to
human agency and placing them in a more complex sociopolitical context.
In focusing on Justice Brewer's effect on the general common law, to the
exclusion of, for example, Justice Story's own conception of Swift and its
reach, does Purcell attribute Swift, and particularly the expansive Swift that
he finds most objectionable, too strongly to the acts and desires of one
man? It becomes, as one reads on, a sometimes odd juxtaposition: the
individual story in which Justice Brandeis's "correct" Erie vanquishes
Justice Brewer's wrongheaded Swift, alongside the complex tale of the
historical and cultural context within which the drama was played out. The
focus on Brewer also leads to what I consider a far more detailed account of
the doctrinal intricacies of his jurisprudence than is necessary for an
understanding of Brewer's place in the narrative of Erie and Progressive
constitutionalism.
The book turns from Justice Brewer to document the growing counter-
reaction to the growth of federal judicial power in the period after the First
World War. Here again Purcell demonstrates concretely the ways in which
changes in political and cultural context affect the assumptions that shape
both doctrinal law and branch affinities. The reaction against federalization
was based on changes both intellectual52 and practical. 3 The Supreme Court
51. Id. at 52. Compare this to Purcell's discussion of Brandeis's objection to Swift. Id. at 165-
66.
52. This is the often-told story of the growth of legal realist and positivist philosophical
thought, the rise of Darwinism with its implication for law that institutions and principles evolve
in response to social change, id. at 67, and the growing influence of Justice Holmes, id. at 68-69.
The intellectual impetus also came from changes in the application of Swift itself, such as its
application in the widely reviled Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
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construed an array of substantive, procedural, and jurisprudential tools to
fend off these attacks, strengthen the courts' ability to protect employers
and other corporate interests, and generally accord with its own deeply held
view of its mission. The description of these tools underlines a theme that
will recur: The judicial choice of when to look to practical consequences
and when to look to abstract theory has an important strategic component.
For example, the Court narrowly construed certain pro-union provisions of
the Clayton Act54 but broadly construed other provisions of antitrust law
and the Commerce Clause to uphold labor injunctions.55 The Court used
diversity jurisdiction, liberty of contract, and the federal common law to
gain jurisdiction over and then uphold yellow dog contracts, 56 and
employed pragmatic, equitable considerations to strike down union
contracts while becoming highly formalistic in the service of employers'
contracts.57
There were many reasons why the campaign to restrict or abolish
diversity jurisdiction was, in large part, unsuccessful"S-reasons involving
matters of timing, politics, and personality.59 The role of the ABA, which
Purcell describes as nakedly partisan on behalf of corporate interests and
the ABA's own prestige, while claiming to represent the public at large,' is
especially noteworthy. The ABA role suggests that centralization and
unifonnity of federal law privileges legal elites, especially, it may be
argued, when the law at stake is arcane procedural law inaccessible to the
layperson. The Progressives' much greater success in restricting the federal
labor injunction was due to a confluence of factors, including the fact that
the cause of labor unions garnered-at least with the Red Scare over and
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928), which was viewed as a flagrant example of the
manipulation of diversity jurisdiction by corporate litigants. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 78; see
also HORWrrz, supra note 49, at 253-66 (tracing the rise of legal formalism); William R. Casto,
The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of Constitutional Revolutions, 62 TUL. L. REV. 907 (1998)
(discussing changes in the intellectual climate that contributed to the overruling of Swift). But see
Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673
(1998) (arguing that the natural law/positivism story explains little).
53. Much of the practical impetus for Progressive reform came from anger at corporate
abuses of diversity jurisdiction in general, and at the use of the diversity jurisdiction to facilitate
the wide use of the federal labor injunction to thwart unionism, in particular. In 1934, the
American Law Institute published a study that documented empirically the pro-corporate uses and
effects of diversity jurisdiction. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 79.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1994) (allowing the United States to sue for actual damages arising out
of injuries sustained from antitrust violations).
55. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 70-77.
56. That is, contracts conditioning continued employment on a promise not to join a labor
union. Id. at 71.
57. Id. at 70-77.
58. Purcell notes that while broad attacks consistently failed, several statutes were passed that
reduced the inequitable impact of diversity. Id. at 77-79.
59. Id. at 77-85.
60. Id. at 83-84.
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the Depression underway-greater mass rallying power than an obscure
issue like diversity jurisdiction ever could.
B. Justice Brandeis and His Erie Decision
The second part of the book focuses on Justice Brandeis and the
decision in Erie. It is no small feat to make a fresh and important
contribution to the literature about Erie, a body of work that has reached
"staggering proportions."" Purcell's approach moves beyond abstract
analysis of judicial process to provide a concrete demonstration of the
variety of interrelated forces that lead to the making and evolution of
precedent. In particular, it sheds light on the dynamics of making precedent
of the magnitude of Erie, and overruling precedent as venerable as the
ninety-year-old decision in Swift v. Tyson. In this part, Purcell shifts focus.
His question becomes: What were the social, political, and historical forces
that gave rise to Justice Brandeis's philosophy and that provided the context
for his decision in Erie?
This strategy is largely successful. A central goal of the work, which it
achieves beautifully, is to present Erie in the context of Justice Brandeis's
jurisprudence, and to enrich the reader's understanding of both by placing
them in a larger historical context. Purcell asserts that "to an unusual
degree, [Erie] embodied the ... constitutional theory of only a single
justice." "62 Purcell's overriding concern with identifying Justice Brandeis's
role in crafting Erie and Justice Brandeis's individual conception of Erie
has its costs, however. One such cost, evident also in Purcell's discussion of
Brewer, is that Purcell goes overboard in his effort to amass a wealth of
detail to support his argument for the importance of Brandeis's role. 63 The
other cost is in the tension created between Purcell's strong allegiance to
Brandeis's individual role and Purcell's sophisticated approach to the
dynamics of judicial decisionmaking and the evolution of legal meaning.
This allegiance also manifests itself in an occasional tendency to portray
Erie as belonging to Brandeis, and thus to portray those who deviated from
Brandeis's vision-whether on the Court that issued the opinion or on
future Courts interpreting it-as betraying the true Erie.64
Though some of the book's detail may appeal mainly to historians,
Purcell's meticulous presentation contains many nuggets that will be of
61. Id. at 2.
62. Id. at 114.
63. See, for example, the extended discussion of who should be credited with insisting on
Erie's constitutional grounding, critiquing the claim that Justices Stone and Black made major
contributions to the Erie decision and to the decision to ground it in the Constitution. Id. at 109-
12.
64. See, e.g., infra note 80 (discussing Purcell's rejection of a possible Tenth Amendment
component of Erie based on his interpretation of Brandeis's intent).
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broader interest. One particularly tantalizing bit is Purcell's theory as to
why Erie was decided without benefit of briefing by the parties on the issue
of whether Swift v. Tyson should be overruled. Erie was the unusual case in
which the federal common law (particularly in the Second Circuit) was
more favorable to the injured plaintiff than to the corporate defendant, the
railroad. An overruling of Swift, relegating Tompkins to Pennsylvania state
law, would have meant victory for the railroad in the case at hand, but
would have cost it far more in the long run of cases. Purcell argues that the
Court gave the railroad's attorney ample opportunity to argue the overruling
of Swift, and in light of his refusal to do so, saw no point in ordering
reargument on the issue.65
Likewise, whether or not Purcell is correct in his assessment of the
extent of Justice Brandeis's influence on Erie, readers will appreciate the
light he sheds on the forces affecting the Justice, and how these forces led
to the theory he espoused. Purcell portrays Brandeis as a morally
committed, theoretically principled pragmatist.66 For Brandeis, process
values like legislative primacy and judicial restraint were not themselves
fundamental, but rather were tools for achieving the core values of political
accountability, constitutional balance, and preclusion of the exercise of
arbitrary power.67 As Purcell claims, "his advocacy of restraint was seldom
far removed from his Progressive social goals."68 He was concerned about
the social and practical consequences of legal rules, including jurisdictional
rules.69 Thus, for example, he viewed federalism "not as a rigid norm or a
cynical excuse but as an evolving ideal to be tested by its social results." 70
65. He argues that though it is true Tompkins's attorneys did not have the opportunity fully to
defend Swift, this disability was counterbalanced by the railroad's failure to raise any argument its
adversaries had been precluded from answering. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 101. A similar issue
arose recently regarding the Supreme Court's decision to hear argument in Dickerson v. United
States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000), the case determining that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994), enacted in
1968, had to be struck down in light of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). When the
government refused to defend § 3501, the Court appointed amicus Paul Cassell to argue that the
statute should be upheld. See Neal Devins, Asking the Right Questions: How the Courts Honored
the Separation of Powers by Reconsidering Miranda, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 251 (2000) (noting the
parallel between the Erie and Dickerson arguments and arguing that the Court was justified in
hearing the issues in both cases). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Should Have Remained
Silent: Why the Court Erred in Deciding United States v. Dickerson, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 287
(2000) (disputing commonalities between the Erie and Dickerson situations).
66. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 117-20. Thus Purcell rejects the claim that Brandeis was a
positivist or a skeptical realist. Purcell argues that although Brandeis liked the idea that law was
derived from the authority of a sovereign, he did not adopt a broader realist philosophy that law
meant only what courts would enforce or that any rule courts enforced was immune to moral or
philosophical critique. Instead, he emphasized the authority of constitutional principle, fairness,
and justice. He believed that "moral 'principles' existed ... [that] could be... developed by
human reason, and.., should guide judicial reasoning." Id. at 182.
67. Id. at 123, 190.
68. Id. at 123.
69. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); PURCELL, supra note 1, at 123 (arguing that, in Ashwander, Brandeis was concerned
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Brandeis believed in localism and small units of organization as a moral
as well as a practical good.71 He believed in rule by the people, and by the
legislature, as the people's representative.72 He shared the Progressive
conviction that legislatures were not only more sympathetic to Progressive
reform, but structurally better suited to achieving it.73
Justice Brandeis's affinity for legislative lawmaking was thus in line
with his most fundamental personal beliefs, and also fell squarely within the
context of the Progressive tradition of the time. It led to his conviction that
Swift had to be overruled because, as a constitutional matter, Swift allowed
the judiciary, an unresponsive and undemocratic institution, to make law
that was impervious to correction by Congress, and to ordain its own
institutional primacy.74 By the same token, Erie's theory of legislative
primacy was both "a constitutional statement of the political ideals of early
twentieth-century Progressivism"75 and a reflection of Brandeis's own
"deeply cherished and fundamental convictions about public policy and
constitutional structure," an implementation of the Progressive values he
"had absorbed... for a lifetime." 
76
It is in this context, Purcell asserts, that the Erie holding must be
understood. He believes that Brandeis decided Erie on constitutional
grounds.77 Specifically, Purcell asserts that Erie was grounded on two
related principles. The constitutional principle was that legislative and
judicial powers are coextensive. Thus the Court has no power to act in areas
in which Congress cannot.7 The essential constitutional error of Swift was
that it denied the existence of legislative power as a prerequisite to judicial
lawmaking. The prudential corollary (albeit one that was quickly drained of
much of its significance by events like the expansion of the commerce
power79) was that the federal courts should not, absent compelling reasons,
not only with judicial restraint, but with the social effects of permitting broad corporate challenges
to legislative action).
70. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 308.
71. Id. at 141-42.
72. Id. at 165-66.
73. Id. Brandeis believed that legislatures possessed the decentralization, the fact-finding
ability, the flexibility, and the responsiveness to experiment, to incorporate new knowledge, and
to inaugurate change when social conditions called for it. Id.
74. Id. at 190. Brandeis also argued that as a prudential matter, Swift allowed the judiciary to
usurp Congress's political role in determining when uniformity was called for, and thus when
state power may be federally limited. Id. at 174-75.
75. Id. at 172.
76. Id. at 140.
77. Purcell believes that a majority supported Brandeis's constitutional language, at least
when the opinion was written, but that Justice Hughes and perhaps others apparently harbored
doubts shortly thereafter. Id. at 113.
78. Id. at 175-77.
79. For examples of cases that vastly expanded the reach of Congress's commerce power, see
Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); and
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see also FREYER, supra note 49, at
142, for a discussion of the shrinking jurisdiction governed by the Erie doctrine.
[Vol. 110: 829
Erie and the History of the One True Federalism
make nonconstitutional law even in areas within the national legislative
power unless Congress has first acted in these areas. In short, he argues that
Erie was based on a theory of legislative primacy."s
C. Erie's Legacy: The Path of Doctrinal Principle
The question of whether Brandeis succeeded in Erie is complex. If he
brought the Constitution closer to his Progressive ideals, did he do so in a
principled manner? Did he do so in a way that would endure? Could he
have done more to achieve his goals? These questions are addressed in the
book's third part, which traces the erosion and creation of meaning in the
Erie decision. This part simultaneously raises some of the book's most
interesting issues-the uses and abuses of neutral jurisdictional principles,
their definition, their strategic advantages and pitfalls, their ethical
boundaries-and highlights some of its more problematic assumptions.
Purcell, while illuminating the insight that historical change and the
processes of interpretation make new versions of doctrine inevitable,8 '
nevertheless appears to display both a particular attachment to the
"Brandeis" version of Erie and an ambivalence toward the idea that this
version could not be maintained as times changed. Though Purcell places
the Erie decision squarely within the Progressive tradition, he notes,
apparently with some chagrin, that Brandeis purposely used neutral
language that masks many of his social concerns. Purcell concedes that
Brandeis had several good reasons to "drain[] his opinion of identifiable,
partisan, and concrete social consequences," 2 but links the opinion's
studied neutrality of language to what Purcell considers its later
misinterpretation. He wonders whether Justice Brandeis could have
protected against the sloughing off of historical and social context, the later
recasting of Erie's holding and significance for different generations, by
writing a more candid opinion. Purcell makes it clear that he believes the
costs of Brandeis's lack of candor were high. Purcell argues, for example,
that the opinion's level of abstraction allowed Justice Frankfurter to
misinterpret and in fact to misrepresent Erie, notably in Guaranty Trust Co.
80. For this reason, Purcell also asserts, Brandeis did not mean to rest the decision on the
Tenth Amendment, since such a basis would have the potential to impose an independent limit on
the federal legislative power. Purcell argues that Brandeis deliberately refrained from quoting the
Tenth Amendment. However, Purcell allows that the opinion does contain some language from a
dissent citing the Amendment, as well as some reference to reserved rights. He believes that this
language was needed to maintain the vote of Justice Hughes, and that both Justices Hughes and
Roberts may have considered the Tenth Amendment the basis of Erie. PURCELL, supra note 1, at
178-80. This is an example of the tension between the notion of "Brandeis's Erie" and the notion
of the "true Erie," which I discuss below. Infra text accompanying notes 81-85.
81. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 4. 303.
82. Id. at 160.
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v. York, 3 portraying it as a case about forum shopping, and ignoring both
its constitutional basis and its concerns about imbedded inequities in
litigation access." Likewise, Purcell argues that the process school
mischaracterized Erie as an exemplar of that school's implicitly
nationalistic vision of neutral principles, again ignoring Erie's concern for
litigant inequality, and paving the way for the Warren Court, in Hanna v.
Plumer,ss to misinterpret Erie as a decision expanding the role of the
federal courts. On a purely practical level, Purcell's description of a lost
"Progressive" Erie is frustrating, because he never makes clear whether the
loss is purely heuristic, or whether, for example, York or Hanna might have
(or even should have, in Purcell's view) been decided differently, or
whether the path of federalism might have been altered, had Erie's political
concerns been more clearly stated.
To some extent, Purcell portrays Brandeis's use of formal, neutral
language as a necessary or at least effective strategy for commanding a
majority and for establishing a general public consensus in favor of this
major doctrinal shift.16 Purcell sees the use of generalized principles like
federalism in place of less socially neutral principles like equality of access
as an admirable effort to reconcile social commitments with broader
commitments to the ideal of principled and evenhanded law. At the same
time, he sees it as a useful strategic tool for portraying a radical shift in
doctrine as inexorable, timeless, and without political or social valence.'
One strategic possibility Purcell does not explore is that Brandeis's
Progressive ideals themselves constrained Brandeis's willingness better to
articulate" a constitutional basis.8 9 If so, perhaps Erie, though its
83. 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945) (holding that federal courts were bound under Erie to apply state
laws if failure to do so would result in different outcomes in federal and state court). Purcell
argues that in this case Justice Frankfurter undercuts Erie's constitutional grounding. PURCELL,
supra note 1, at 213-16.
84. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 213-16.
85. 380 U.S. 460, 469-70 (1965) (holding that the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate
Procedure are to be applied by federal courts even if a conflicting state rule would produce a
different outcome). Purcell argues that in this case Chief Justice Warren uses Erie to "affirm the
breadth and independence of federal judicial power." PURCELL, supra note 1, at 289.
86. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 163.
87. Id. at 156-64.
88. In 1958, Professor Alfred Hill observed that "the constitutional basis of Erie has been
widely regarded as dictum, and rather dubious dictum at best." Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and
the Constitution, 53 Nw. U. L. REv. 427,427 & n.3 (1958) (citing numerous articles). As recently
as 1996, Wright, Miller, and Cooper stated that "[h]owever tempting it might be to dismiss the
constitutional discussion in Erie as so much dicta, as many have done," it is necessary to accept
its constitutional basis because the Court expicitly stated it was relying on the Constitution.
19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4505 (2d ed. 1996).
The precise nature of the constitutional basis continues to generate debate. See, e.g., LOUISE
WEINBERG, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND COMMENTS ON JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL
POWER 10-15 (1994) (canvassing various scholarly arguments for Erie's constitutional basis,
which include equal protection, the Tenth Amendment, separation of powers, and due process).
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constitutional grounding may have been stronger, was not so unlike
Brandeis's decision in Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n 9 (a decision of
which Purcell is highly critical), in the sense that its constitutional basis
served primarily as a means of achieving social and political goals.
Although Purcell suggests that the social goals of Erie could have been
better protected against erosion or misunderstanding, for the most part he
tempers this judgment with awareness of the practical and institutional
constraints within which judges operate: first, that the meaning of Erie must
come from the opinion that was written, as opposed to the opinion Brandeis
would have liked to write; and, second, that the Erie doctrine was bound to
evolve, and it is probably not productive to view such evolution as a
betrayal of one man's vision.9' Purcell observes that as social context,
political assumptions, and individual perspectives change, a decision based
on the assumptions of a dramatically different age cannot "maintain its
intended social and political significance unchanged." 
92
The age that gave rise to the Erie decision was ending as the decision
was issued, dramatically altering many of the social concerns and political
assumptions on which the decision had been based. The new Roosevelt
Court93 expanded federal power to validate the newly established
administrative state. The character of both Congress and the judiciary
changed markedly. Congress in the postwar period began to draw away
from New Deal activism and legislative experimentation, which had by
then taken on more negative connotations, and it became involved in anti-
subversion investigations that posed severe threats to civil liberties. The
Court, conversely, was becoming more liberal-less identified with
corporate wealth and property and more protective of civil liberties. These
changes "scrambled and largely reversed" the branch affinities of the half-
century preceding Erie.9"
89. For example, if Brandeis believed that the bases for declaring Swift unconstitutional
would interfere with the expansion of the commerce power, or with the power of Congress to
delegate its lawmaking power to the courts, or would expand the reach of the Tenth Amendment,
he may have been reluctant to articulate any of these bases, all of which were at odds with his
broader Progressive goals. Conversation with Erwin Chemerinsky, Sydney M. Irmas Professor of
Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics and Political Science, University of Southern California Law
School, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Sept. 16, 2000).
90. 277 U.S. 274 (1928). For further discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying
notes 286-291.
91. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 163-64. Purcell concludes that "[p]ractical considerations and
the demands of a majoritarian institution committed to publishing reasoned opinions make such
obfuscating strategies inevitable. They should not, however, allow such judicial craft to pass
unnoticed and unexamined." Id. at 306.
92. Id. at 195.
93. The confrontations over President Roosevelt's Court-packing plan came to a head in
1937. Id. at 33-38. Within two years of the Erie decision, or four years of the Court fight, only
Justices Stone and Roberts remained from the old Court. Id. at 201.
94. Id. at 199.
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As changes in its political, social, and constitutional95 context obscured
much of the original impetus behind Erie and changed its significance,
Purcell argues, the shift in Erie's meaning was also accelerated by
ideological developments. Progressive concerns faded96 and were replaced,
in the postwar period, by concerns with totalitarianism and subversion, and
a desire for stability, authority, objectivity, and moral order. Scholars and
jurists searched for a means of reaffirming the rule of law and the moral
content of law in the face of the legal realist insight that law is unavoidably
made by judges.97 Justice Frankfurter was one of the first to turn to this
task, which eventually became the mission of the emerging legal process
school.9"
Purcell is highly critical of Justice Frankfurter. Purcell portrays
Frankfurter as falsely wearing the mantle of the authoritative expositor of
Brandeis's philosophy while, for personal and strategic reasons, seriously
misconstruing it. Purcell charges Frankfurter with recasting in the 1940s
Erie's social concerns about unfairness and inequality into politically
neutral concerns about forum shopping and with recasting the overthrow of
Swift as the overruling of a particular way of looking at law rather than as
based on the Constitution.9 Ultimately, stripped of reference to any of its
original social or political motives, Erie became, for Frankfurter and his
proponents, a case embodying "an unyielding commitment to the abstract
standards" of judicial self-restraint in deference to the other branches of
government. 100
As the legal process school took shape during the postwar period,
Purcell argues, it helped shape yet another version of the Erie doctrine,
credited largely to Henry Hart. Hart is the last of the pivotal figures in this
narrative and one of the creators of the process school. Though Hart began
his career as a New Deal Progressive, 0 ' he came to embrace the ideal of
95. See id. at 200-01 (discussing the ways in which the abandonment of limits on the
Commerce Clause, the expansion of state and federal statutes displacing common law, and the
introduction of the new federal common law based on interpretation of federal constitutional and
statutory provisions, changed the operational meaning of the case).
96. For example, the labor movement grew more powerful, unequal access to diversity
jurisdiction was alleviated, protective social legislation was passed, and the antipathy toward large
national corporations waned. Id. at 197-98.
97. Id. at 222-28.
98. The beginnings of the legal process school were in the work Hart did with Albert Sacks.
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
Some have argued that Hart and Wechsler's neutral principles were not a natural outgrowth of the
legal process school, which viewed "the nature of law as consisting of values to be served, as well
as rules and standards." Vincent A. Wellman, Positivism, Emergent and Triumphant, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 1722, 1741 (1999).
99. See PURCELL, supra note 1, at 202-16. See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99
(1945), the case in which Frankfurter recast Erie in this manner, according to Purcell.
100. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 227.
101. Id. at 229-32.
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law as process°2-a rational and cohesive system for which the most
important goal is the proper allocation of institutional competencies. He
viewed law as made by judges who share the fundamental and ascertainable
goals and values of their society. He believed that so long as judges acted
within proper institutional bounds, the results of fair procedures would be
presumptively fair. In short, the morality inhered in the process.
As the legal process school became ascendant in the postwar period, its
assumptions about institutional competencies began contributing to the next
major shift in branch affinities. For example, because Hart believed in the
effectiveness of the institutional constraints on judges, he began to identify
courts with an intrinsically superior ability to make principled judgments
and engage in flexible, long-range thinking. For both him and Herbert
Wechsler, federalism was the controlling ideological force, the central
normative commitment, providing the coherence for the newly developed
field of federal jurisdiction. Purcell argues that Hart's federalism had a
decided bias in favor of the federal courts: Hart believed in the need for
uniformity, the interstitial nature of federal law, and the essential role of the
federal courts. Purcell calls him not an "advocate for a sophisticated legal
'federalism,"' but instead a "prophet of a new, intricate, and exceptionally
sophisticated version of judicial nationalism." 103 As Hart grew wary of
judicial restraint, he reconceived Brandeis as well, transforming Brandeis's
defense of legislative primacy into a broad opposition to arbitrary
government." When Hart reimagined Erie, it became not only consistent
with these principles but their seminal and ideal exemplar. He cast it as
establishing a neutral allocative principle, unrelated to animating social
issues or to legislative primacy. 5 Purcell charges that Hart's conception
elevated Erie to the rank of first principles by "stripping it of political and
social content" and reconceiving it as overtly antihistorical, grounded in an
abstract and timeless "logic of federalism." 106
Someone weaned on Hart and Wechsler's federal courts jurisprudence
might be surprised by Purcell's claim that it betrayed a bias in favor of the
federal courts. 07 Both men are often associated with the view that state and
102. Hart's postwar reevaluation of his values in light of the challenges of totalitarianism and
the Cold War led him to his later, better-known commitment to neutral principles. Id. at 234-39.
103. Id. at 249.
104. Id. at 242.
105. The version of due process on which it was grounded was concerned with the problem
of binding litigants with inconsistent rules, and not with issues of unequal power. Hart "assumed
the existence of Brandeis's abstract universe of mobile litigant atoms." Id. at 252.
106. Id. at 248.
107. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 13, at 696-97 (stating that Hart and Wechsler's "writings
were curiously infected with a... willingness to equate state and federal courts"). Amar argues
that Wechsler's writings were even more explicit in defense of state-federal parity. Id. (citing
Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1005-06 (1965)).
Professor Fallon of Harvard Law School, one of the authors of Hart and Wechsler's casebook
since its third edition, writes that Warren Court decisions like Brown threatened Hart and
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federal courts are fungible, and Hart famously argued that state courts "are
the primary guarantors of constitutional rights."108 Purcell's history
provides a partially satisfactory explanation for this reaction: that it might
be based on Hart's ambivalent and skeptical attitude toward the Warren
Court rather than his more favorable attitude toward the federal courts in
general.'O° However, as the narrative reaches a point in recent history about
which most scholars have both a fuller appreciation of the cultural context
and their own biases to contend with,"' it becomes more plausible to
speculate that Purcell is acting from his own set of assumptions about
judicial supremacy. In general, the book would have benefited from more
discussion of the purposes of Article III and the attributes, if any, that set an
Article III court apart from either a state court or the political branches of
the federal government. Thus, for example, when Purcell concludes that the
ALI, in its 1969 study of diversity jurisdiction, betrayed its own principles
by failing to recommend changes that would increase federal supervision of
civil rights cases, he has not really explained why he believes the federal
courts would safeguard civil rights better than state courts would."'
This criticism notwithstanding, Purcell's analysis of the ALI study
provides the most vivid and concrete exegesis I have read of the historical
and political contingency, and the strategic utility, of the notion of neutral
jurisdictional principles." 2 He does so by deconstructing the "basic
Wechsler's view of federalism because they undermined traditions of federalism and "reflected
the judiciary in a leadership role." Fallon, supra note 13, at 960.
108. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1953). Interestingly, Akhil Amar cites
Hart's Dialogue as one example of his willingness to equate federal and state courts, focusing on
its view that though the Constitution requires that some court be open to hear federal
constitutional claims, Congress has broad authority to decide whether that court will be state or
federal. Amar, supra note 13, at 698. Purcell cites the same Dialogue as an example of his judicial
nationalism, focusing on its argument that Congress cannot strip the federal courts of their
jurisdiction to the extent it interferes with their essential function of articulating federal
constitutional norms. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 245 & n. 115.
109. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 255. Purcell acknowledges Hart's discomfort with the
methods and perspectives of the Warren Court, and suggests that his discomfort was partly
grounded in Hart's inability to reconcile his disapproval of the Warren Court's activism with the
fact that it actually embodied many of his own fundamental values and ideals. Wechsler shared
Hart's disapproval of the Warren Court, evidenced most famously by Wechsler's criticism of
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), in his classic defense of neutral principles.
See Wechsler, supra note 12.
110. Here I acknowledge my own longstanding bias in favor of federal judicial supremacy as
a means of protecting individual rights and liberties, and my own rather belated understanding that
the reversal of branch ideologies called the abstract nature of my loyalty to federal judicial
supremacy into serious question.
111. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 282.
112. Id. at 273-83. He places the ALI study at the intersection of several developments,
including the postwar need for stability and consensus, which generated the movement toward
codification of legal principles; the Warren Court's need to articulate justifications for its
activism, which countered perceptions that it was ideological and countermajoritarian; and the
legal elite's interest in perpetuating federal courts and federal law, and the concomitant
flourishing of the process school.
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principles of federalism," 113 upon which the ALl placed its imprimatur. The
most fundamental of these principles was that federal courts are uniquely
suited to adjudicating federal law and that federal law is of paramount
importance.' 14 He lays bare the contestable assumptions, the confusions
between first principles and end objectives, the selective uses of abstraction,
which shaped and defined the ALl study. Nevertheless, he argues, the study
served its purpose: It defused attacks on the Warren Court, enshrined the
idea of neutral principles, and again helped reshape Erie, this time as a
decision exalting the role of the federal courts."5
And thus to the present, in which the Warren Court's version of
federalism has been subject to the vagaries of changing historical and social
context. In the Rehnquist era, scholars are in the position to observe the
reversal of branch affinities, with a federal judiciary shaped by Republican
appointments" 6 embracing an activism based on its own set of assumptions
about the dictates of federalism. Erie remains an "ideological Rorschach
test" "7 in this era, where it is used in arguments against expansive private
rights of action, and more broadly as representing a limited judicial role in
the scheme of separated powers.1 8 Purcell's book teaches that historical
change and the processes of interpretation "ma[k]e such new versions
inevitable." "' Case law works itself pure-it sheds its historical and
political specifics and becomes increasingly abstract, and therefore
amenable to transformation in new contexts. It works itself pure, but does
not necessarily become "righter," as Purcell says. Yet his argument for an
understanding of the historical, political, and cultural contingencies shaping
113. Id. at 272.
114. Id. at 273.
115. Id. at 270-84. Purcell argues, for example, that the ALI study helped justify the approach
exemplified by Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), in which the Warren Court safeguarded
federal uniformity and independence from the states. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 287.
116. It is implicit in Purcell's description of the changing political bent of the Court that such
evolution is connected to the political nature of the appointment process. The notion of the Court
as a countermajoritarian institution, of course, fails to take this connection into account. Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U.
PA. L. REv. 971 (2000) (examining the influence of politics, electoral and otherwise, on judicial
behavior).
117. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 287. The battle over the legacy of Justice Brandeis continues
as well. See, for example, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000), in which both
majority and dissent claim to be advancing the Justice's most cherished values. Justice Stevens, in
dissent, invokes Brandeis's famous ode to state social and economic experimentation, arguing that
the Court prevented New Jersey's experiment of according protection to gays under its public
accommodations law. Id. at 2459 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the
majority, replies that Justice Brandeis, though he championed state experimentation in the
economic realm, did not champion experimentation with the First Amendment. Id. at 2457-58.
118. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 290; see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 37-38 (1980);
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677,742 (1979); George D. Brown, Of Activism and Erie-The
Implication Doctrine's Implications for the Nature and Role of the Federal Courts, 69 IOWA L.
REV. 617 (1984); Donald L. Doemberg, Juridical Chameleons in the "New Erie" Canal, 1990
UTAH L. REv. 759.
119. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 295.
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legal doctrine is, not an argument for cynicism toward principled legal
analysis. Purcell's optimistic claim is that historical understanding can help
teach how to shape legal institutions and processes "to sustain and enhance
a decent, ordered, and relatively democratic life." 120 In Part III, I consider
this claim.
III. LEGAL DISTINCTIONS AND HISTORICAL CORRECTIVES:
REEXAMINING THE TRULY NATIONAL AND THE TRULY LOCAL
A. Narrative Coherence in Law and History
While historians may disagree about the extent to which history should
or can provide lessons for the present, they tend to balk at sacrificing the
complexity of the past for a linear story with a tidy and usable moral. 2 '
They have unflattering names for historical fallacies like "presentism,"
122
which views history as "prun[ing] away the dead branches of the past,
and... preserv[ing] the green buds and twigs which have grown into the
dark forest of our contemporary world." 123 As Laura Kalman observes:
"Too much orderliness... makes historians suspicious." 124 While lawyers
may argue about the proper uses or interpretation of history, we do not
argue about whether history provides lessons for the present. We tend to
use history as we do every other tool in our arsenal: to argue a position. For
lawyers' purposes, a linear progression leading to a tidy moral is far more
useful than a complex, ambiguous story.
For example, the received legal wisdom about Swift and Erie has it that
Swift was based on a misunderstanding about the nature of law. The Swift
Court, in the thrall of natural law, mistook law for a "brooding
omnipresence," 125 failed to account for the source of the federal common
law, and thus created an illegitimate body of law. The Erie Court, with the
120. Id. at 6.
121. Indeed, this attempt to extract specific lessons from history and apply them literally to
present problems has been labeled "the didactic fallacy." FISCHER, supra note 35, at 157
(emphasis omitted).
122. Id. at 135-40. Historian David Hackett Fischer defines presentism as "a complex
anachronism, in which the antecedent in a narrative series is falsified by being defined or
interpreted in terms of the consequent." Id. at 135. But see KALMAN, supra note 5, at 183-84, 335
n.41 (pointing out that not all historians share Fischer's antipathy toward presentism, and arguing
that the difficulty is in navigating between an acontextual presentism and an overly contextual
antiquarianism).
123. FISCHER, supra note 35, at 135.
124. KALMAN, supra note 5, at 186.
125. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 220, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting), in which Justice Holmes took issue with the notion that general principles of
admiralty law existed throughout the United States, stating, "The common law is not a brooding
omnipresence in the sky but the articulate law of some sovereign .... It always is the law of some
State ... ." Id. at 222.
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benefit of the insights of positivism and legal realism, corrected the error.
The Lochner Court was likewise portrayed, in retrospect, as terribly
mistaken-stubbornly insistent on its own narrow and wrongheaded
political and social biases, which were wholly out of step with the laudable
aims of the New Deal. Only when forced to do so could it see beyond its
laissez-faire political ends to the proper evolution of doctrine. In these
comforting stories, the law evolves in a linear progression. It works itself
pure and it works itself right.
Both stories are, of course, far more complicated. The meaning and
moral of the Lochner era are, even now, hotly contested. Much recent
scholarship suggests that the Lochner-era judges were guided by values that
were widely shared by the populace-government by the people, individual
liberty, the right to private property, and Jacksonian notions of equality.
They were asked to interpret these values in a radically new context,,26 did
so through the lens of assumptions shaped by their class, religion, life
experiences, and institutional role,"' and thus tended to favor the interests
of industrial progress over those of disfavored groups. These jurists did not
view themselves as rogue ideologues, and in fact "[i]n propounding laissez-
faire constitutionalism, they believed public opinion was on their side."2
They attempted to act as men of principle, but in some respects, their
principles were forged in "a past that was fading beyond retrieval."' 29
Likewise, neither Justice Story nor subsequent Justices who expanded the
reach of Swift experienced themselves as communing with a brooding
omnipresence. 3° Rather, they viewed themselves as interpreting Article IH
to determine the proper role of the federal courts in the constitutional
126. For example, political scientist Howard Gillman argues:
[T]he story of the Lochner era is not about how reactionary justices in the late
nineteenth century became more daring in their willingness to exploit legal materials in
order to protect or promote their personal class or policy biases .... [but] is the story of
how a changing social structure exposed the conservatism and class bias inherent in
dominant ideological structures first formulated and institutionalized by the framers of
the U.S. Constitution.
GELLMAN, supra note 21, at 199. But see Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (critiquing what he calls the "revisionist" theory of the Lochner era).
127. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 320 n.3 (presenting a nuanced exploration of the complex
interaction of influences on the Lochner-era judges).
128. Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1, 108 (1991); see also Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REv. 1 (1996) (arguing that the Court generally
does not attempt to force legal regimes on an unwilling populace).
129. Siegel, supra note 128, at 109. Siegel argues that certain portions of the Lochner legacy,
including the judicial development of substantive rights and the view-expressed by
commentators of the time-that public opinion should affect the content of constitutional law,
were in fact quite forward-looking. Id. at 110-11.
130. The "brooding omnipresence" language appeared, not in majority opinions applying the
federal common law, but in a dissent critiquing it. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 222 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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structure,' 3 ' albeit in a way that grew increasingly contested3 ' and difficult
to countenance as its interpretive context changed. It is difficult to perceive
the deeply embedded assumptions of one's own age. The understanding of
how pervasive these assumptions are, and indeed of the fact that they do not
simply reflect a "noncontingent reality," 133 is an insight that comes with
historical perspective.
If the legal versions of these stories are "dysfunctional" as history,'
TM
the historical versions are likely to appear similarly dysfunctional to legal
audiences. Historical and legal analysis, as Purcell notes, are "profoundly
different intellectual enterprises." "' Every genre has its requisites, and
stories defying those requisites risk appearing incoherent. Coherence, as
narrative theorists explain, is the quality possessed by a story that appears,
to its audience, shapely and well-formed:' 36
Shaping a narrative means determining what events and details are
relevant, which requires a standard of relevance. It means
determining how these events are connected to each other, and to
the whole, which requires both a notion of causality and a standard
for defining the whole. This standard is most often supplied by the
conventionalized norms of the genre .... 13'
Judges are expected to create a story that portrays the evolution of doctrine
as the linear result of doctrinal logic.'38 This is the linkage that reassures the
observer that law is rendered, not as a series of case-by-case (or-more to
the point-judge-by-judge) decisions, but as a coherent, stable, predictable
"body" of law, subject to the constraints called the rule of law.
131. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 52, at 683 (arguing that Swift's supporters were
themselves legal positivists). Michael Collins argues that natural rights discourse did not posit that
laws could be struck down based on abstract notions of natural law but, rather, structured legal
arguments by suggesting first principles. Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner-Diversity
Jurisdiction and the Development of General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1307
(2000).
132. Tony Freyer, among others, suggests that Swift was quite uncontroversial when first
decided. FREYER, supra note 49, at 93; see also Lessig, supra note 49, at 1788.
133. Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 513 (1988).
134. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 4.
135. Id. at 400 n.27.
136. See, e.g., Martin Price, The Irrelevant Derail and the Emergence of Form, in ASPECTS
OF NARRATIVE 69. 70-71 (J. Hillis Miller ed., 1971); Hayden White, The Value of Narrativity in
the Representation of Reality, in ON NARRATIVE 1, 15 (WJ.T. Mitchell ed., 1981) (discussing the
attributes of a well-formed and satisfying narrative, and the ways in which such narrative
expectations are culturally shaped).
137. Bandes, supra note 25, at 1310 (citing SEYMOUR CHATMAN, STORY AND DISCOURSE 21
(1978)).
138. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 228-32 (1986) (comparing judicial
interpretation to writing a chain novel); Ferguson, supra note 10, at 214 (describing judgment as a
process in which "[w]hat was and what is come together in the ruling expectation of what must
be").
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Legal analysis, and particularly judicial opinion writing, strips away
much of the context that historians value. Law achieves its appearance of
continuity and coherence, in part, by assuming the existence of stable
essences like legislature or right reason or democratic consensus or
federalism. It treats abstract and general categories "as coherent structures
of concepts and principles" '39 whose underlying meaning does not change
in context or over time. Although the creation of doctrine is an essential
part of the legal process, it is not obvious that it must, at the same time, be a
process of erasing social and cultural context, and of masking contingency,
ideology, and choice. Nor is it obvious that the creation of doctrine needs to
rely on fixed categories impervious to change. In a sense this is old legal
realist ground, but the historical understanding of doctrinal development
illustrates, vividly and concretely, what gets lost in the process of creating
doctrine."4 As Purcell's rich account of the evolution of the Erie doctrine
shows, the evolution of doctrine rarely proceeds in a linear progression. It
is, instead, a pattern of change and continuity, shaped by (and itself a force
in shaping) historical, political, and cultural, as well as legal, forces.
The question Purcell raises is whether legal analysis might benefit from
a greater acknowledgment of such forces. Can legal scholars learn of and
admit to a richer context for decisionmaking without compromising the
coherence and stability of doctrinal legal development? The answer
depends on what values the rule of law needs to safeguard, and at what cost.
A conception of the rule of law that most highly values continuity with past
doctrine may appear stable and predictable. However, its costs are great. It
may too often sacrifice substantive justice.4' It may sacrifice the ability to
evolve with changing conditions, and may even interfere with the
willingness to recognize the point at which the stability itself becomes
illusory.
History can help here. It can help show how and why certain principles
achieved immanent status, and in what form, and for how long. History
teaches that in each era there are animating assumptions that go without
saying. These assumptions, as long as they are left unexamined and
uncontested, lend the law an appearance of stability, coherence, and
political neutrality. This is a familiar insight in the context of Swift and
139. GREY, supra note 10, at 2. This tendency is often referred to as conceptualism, which
Thomas Grey identifies as a type of jurisprudential formalism. Id.
140. See also Gordon, supra note 10, at 1020-21 (arguing that a historical understanding of
the evolution of doctrine is threatening to the aim of mainstream legal scholarship, which is to
demonstrate that lawmaking is rationally related to some coherent conceptual ordering scheme).
141. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse,
97 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 10-24 (1997) (comparing historicist and formalist notions of the rule of law
with notions keyed to fair process and substantive justice); Jackson, supra note 8, at 2255-56
(comparing, in the federalism context, adjudication by rule with adjudication by judgment);
Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 784-92 (1989)
(considering various conceptions of the rule of law).
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Lochner. Justice Story could, for a time, point with some assurance to a
body of customary law governing commercial transactions,'42 until a
confluence of cultural and historical forces called the transcendent nature of
commercial law into question.'43 The approach taken by Lochner-era judges
only gradually began to look like a particular political philosophy. It was
based on beliefs about liberty of contract that these judges reasonably
assumed were based on traditional and enduring principles of American
constitutionalism. These beliefs shaped the judges' most deeply held
assumptions and first principles, 44 and gave their system coherence and
unity."4 Only when these assumptions became contested were they
transformed, in the public eye, from effective constraints into ideological
value choices.'" Only then did the system's coherence appear suspect.
It is important to note that the coherence and unity of the common law
were never truly uncontested. An endemic problem with assuming enduring
principles based on consensus is, of course, in defining who counts as part
of the consensus. A related problem is the tendency to believe the
universality of one's own viewpoint, or at least one's own realm of
experience,"' especially "when [one's] strongest and least conscious class
biases [are] engaged. n"' This problem is easy to identify in Purcell's
description of Justice Brewer's equation of his own religious and political
values with those of the enduring common law, and thus of the
Constitution. It becomes harder to see when the values are less obviously
anachronistic and, in general, when they are more difficult to sort out from
the observer's own values.
B. Neutral Principles: Coherence Arising from Consensus
A case in point is the field of federal courts, which came of age in the
1950s, and whose organizing assumptions were widely accepted when
many of today's scholars and jurists were in law school. 49 The legal
process school and its conception of neutral jurisdictional principles were
142. See Lessig, supra note 49, at 1788. But see HoRWrrz, supra note 49, at 245-49 (arguing
that Story's view in Swift is sharply opposed by his approach in his treatise, and that the
declaratory theory of law was eroding by the 1780s).
143. FREYER, supra note 49, at 94-97.
144. Collins, supra note 131, at 1307-08.
145. GREY, supra note 10, at 7-8.
146. Lessig, supra note 49, at 1792-95; Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L.
REv. 873 (1987).
147. Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Cm!. L. REV.
361,377 (1996); Bandes, supra note 25, at 1275-1319.
148. GREY, supra note 10, at 10.
149. Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction
Opinions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 75, 133-34, 133 n.236 (1998); see also id. at 133 n.237 (noting that a
majority of sitting Supreme Court Justices not only attended Harvard Law School during the
height of the legal process period but also took Hart and Sacks's legal process class).
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never without critics, 5 ' but for many years the critique did little to dim the
luster of the Hart and Wechsler paradigm. Many of the process school's
assumptions continue to influence the legal community's understanding of
what count as proper reasons for decision, what matters are irrelevant, and
what grounds should be deemed unprincipled, political, and unduly value-
laden. "'51 Yet some of its most basic assumptions went unarticulated and
undefended, and are only gradually revealed to be time-bound and
contestable. Therefore, placing doctrine in its historical context is of
particular importance to the field of federal courts.
Purcell describes a field that began to take shape in the 1930s and
1940s, inspired by Brandeis and molded by Frankfurter, and "[b]orn of
political commitment and ideological conviction." '  Yet most legal
scholars know the field of federal courts in its substantially different
postwar incarnation. The field today's scholars know-the one shaped
primarily by Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler-is linked "almost
inextricably" to the legal process methodology that they likewise
pioneered.53 It is a field that was premised on the perception of a particular
problem: the countermajoritarian difficulty."5 That is, the perceived
problem was that the judiciary, which is unaccountable to the electorate,
inevitably makes law, rather than simply interpreting the law made by the
democratically elected political branches. This is a problem because it
permits the undemocratic judiciary to make political, value-laden decisions
that ought to be the province of the political branches.'55 The definition of
150. E.g., Duxbury, supra note 13, at 677 (discussing the contemporary critics of Wechsler's
notion of neutral principles); G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration:
Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 288 (1973) (referring to critics
of Hart, such as Thurman Arnold, as "bucking the scholarly tide").
151. See Duxbury, supra note 13, at 676 (arguing that many scholars continue to be swayed
by the neutral principles thesis); Peller, supra note 13, at 571 (arguing that the process approach
continues to form background assumptions for most centrist legal scholars); Wells, supra note 4,
at 94-95 (arguing that federal courts scholars, with few exceptions, claim to subscribe to the Hart
and Wechsler model). But see Wells, supra note 4, at 138 (arguing that the Court claims to
implement legal process values when in fact the doctrine is often at odds with those values).
152. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 4.
153. Fallon, supra note 13, at 956; see also Amar, supra note 13, at 691-92 (arguing that
legal process methodology dovetails with the scope of federal jurisdiction and indeed seems to
have helped set the boundaries of the field as defined by Hart and Wechsler).
154. The difficulty with giving too much power to unelected judges was most famously
elaborated by Alexander M. Bickel in, among other works, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
(1962). Of course, the starting assumption of the countermajoritarian difficulty is that the judicial
branch is countermajoritarian, whereas the executive and legislative branch are representative and
democratic. This assumption, like much of Bickel's thesis, is open to argument. See, e.g., Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution,
103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 65 (1989) (arguing that each branch has both majoritarian and non-
majoritarian aspects); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 74 (1986) (raising the possibility of the judiciary as
representative of the people).
155. Scholars have often observed that the preoccupation with this difficulty, real or
perceived, has become one of the "starting points of constitutional theory." KALMAN, supra note
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the problem, then, was premised on a particular view of democracy and of
where it resides in America's tripartite system (that is, in the political
branches and not the judiciary). This view of democracy was billed as the
product of a societal consensus, though the claim of consensus went
undefended."5 6
The notion of consensus that was so crucial to the coherence of the
process methodology was a curious blend of the purportedly descriptive
and the aspirational.'57 It was, as Judge Posner described it, an
"unacknowledged dependence on homogeneity of outlook and of
values." '58 The belief in the existence of homogeneity was in part wishful
thinking,5 9 but perhaps more accurately explained as a mistaken belief in
the universality of a particular viewpoint, not much different from the sort
of which the Lochner-era judges were accused. Or perhaps, it is more
accurately explained as a sort of willed consensus, reinforced by the
assumption that it was morally desirable and indeed crucial to
democracy."
The undefended notion of democracy, and the premises flowing from it,
not only defined the problem, but, unsurprisingly, were an essential part of
its solution. The problem as defined assumes the need for a theory
5, at 231. For liberals in particular, the challenge was to find a theory that would explain why the
judicial imposition of values in Lochner was illegitimate without invalidating the foundations of
Brown. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Jurisprudence of Brown and the Dilemmas of
Liberalism, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 599, 602 (1979); see also OWEN M. FISS, 8 HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE,
1888-1910, at 9-12 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1993) (describing the liberal dilemma); KALMAN, supra
note 5, at 42 ("They never found it."); Barry Friedman, The History of the Counternajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Five: The Birth of an Academic Obsession (Aug. 30, 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (discussing the origins of the academic focus on reconciling
judicial review with democracy).
156. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 75-76 (1995); Duxbury, supra note 13, at
643; Peller, supra note 13, at 601.
157. Duxbury, supra note 13, at 673.
158. POSNER, supra note 156, at 75-76.
159. Certainly it was not descriptively accurate. See Duxbury, supra note 13, at 643
(" [I]t... reinforced an image of the United States which, in truth, belonged to the previous
century."); id. (citing MICHAEL P. ROGIN, THE INTELLECTUALS AND MCCARTHY: THE RADICAL
SPECTER 278 (1967)). Although the civil rights era is often portrayed as the moment in which
moral consensus began to crumble, descriptions of the immediate postwar period as a time of
shared consensus have a hollow ring. It was, after all, the sociological age of David Riesman and
William Hollingsworth Whyte, Jr.; the height of the McCarthy era; the period prior to Brown v.
Board of Education and Cooper v. Aaron, just on the heels of Korematsu v. United States; well
before women were entitled, even on paper, to equal protection; and, like every other period in
history, a time in which the federal courts ignored or betrayed the sovereignty of the Indian tribes.
DAVID RIESMAN, THE LONELY CROWD: A STUDY OF THE CHANGING AMERICAN CHARACTER
(1969); WILLIAM H. WHYTE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349
U.S. 294 (1955); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944); see Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1989).
160. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTtFIC
NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 256 (1973).
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identifying the constraints that will prevent judges from allowing improper
factors to unduly influence decisionmaking. When Hart and Wechsler
joined forces to produce the legendary textbook that shaped the field of
federal courts, they sought to impose a sense of coherence on the "vague
and unruly elements of jurisprudential debate." 6' The guiding principles of
the field were designed to impose coherence by addressing the
countermajoritarian difficulty in two complementary ways: through the
allocation of decisionmaking power among the branches of government and
through constraints on judicial decisionmaking.
The emphasis on the importance of allocational choices followed from
the definition of democracy as the product of consensus. When consensus is
itself defined as morally desirable, the premium is placed on creating and
safeguarding a fair process for achieving agreement, rather than on ensuring
that the results of the process are themselves normatively desirable. The
idea was that the morality and justice of outcomes arrived at through
regular, "democratic," procedures could generally be assumed. The view of
democracy as built on consensus also privileged the legislative branch as
more democratic than the judicial branch, and thus as the preferred conduit
for achieving consensus. It seemed to follow that judicial opportunities to
make ideological choices should be minimized by assigning a severely
constrained role to judges. This solution assumed that the jurisdiction to
make value choices is capable of such allocation-that it is possible to
make broadly applicable rules that channel ideological decisionmaking to
the political branches. Thus the very coherence of the field of federal
courts, at least as originally conceived, depended on the possibility of
identifying a consistent set of procedural rules constraining undemocratic
decisionmaking"' which can stand apart from the substantive value
questions that are largely allocated to the political branches.' 63
Legal process theorists believed that such rules could not in themselves
be ideological or value-laden. These theorists considered fair procedures to
be those that adhered to transsubstantive, outcome-neutral allocative
principles like federalism. The process school's particular notion of how
judicial decisionmaking ought to be constrained also relies on the
undefended notion of consensus. It addresses the problem by assuming that
judges will be guided in their decisionmaking by this very societal
consensus. Because the consensus is discoverable, judges can discern it
through reasoned elaboration, which assumes that "for every judicial
161. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 243.
162. This is not to say that the result of judicial decisionmaking, even when properly
constrained, would be correct in each case. See Fallon, supra note 13, at 962 (asserting that Hart
and Wechsler's controlling insight was that, assuming proper allocation of authority, the authority
to decide must at least sometimes include the authority to decide wrongly).
163. See Peller, supra note 13, at 567.
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problem there [i]s ultimately a 'reasonable' solution," with "reasonable"
defined in terms of the value preferences of American society.'
14
The definition of a neutral principle was itself, in an often noted irony,
not well-elaborated. 65 In legal philosopher Neil Duxbury's view, Wechsler,
at least, left the term largely undefined because he assumed that it, too,
flowed from the notion of consensus. As Duxbury says, "'[n]eutrality' and
'generality' are assumed by Wechsler to have meanings shared by all
reasonable people." 166 Thus the nature or prevalence of the assumptions
underlying the principle went unexamined. As Cass Sunstein, Gary Peller,
and others have neatly demonstrated, the Hart and Wechsler version of
neutrality, much like that of the Court that struck down Lochner, was based
on deeply embedded, and generally status-quo-enforcing, assumptions
about the distribution of power and resources. 167 Any attempt to unsettle
power would look political and nonneutral.
The field of federal courts thus maintains and justifies its internal
coherence in a number of mutually reinforcing ways. 68 Jeremy Waldron, in
a recent article, notes that it is not necessarily problematic, and may even at
times be helpful, for a field to make use of internally defined concepts. 169 It
becomes problematic when the concepts are tautological, 7 ' when they are
defined "in a very tight circle, a circle of vanishingly small diameter, by
reference to exactly the phenomenon [they are] supposed to explain." 7
164. White, supra note 150, at 287 (citing Henry Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-
Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84, 100 (1959) (discussing the
"maturing of collective thought")).
165. See, e.g., Duxbury, supra note 13, at 681; Barry Friedman, Neutral Principles: A
Retrospective, 50 VAND. L. REV. 503, 519 n.98 (1997); Arthur S. Miller & Ronald F. Howell, The
Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661 passim (1960).
166. E.g., Duxbury, supra note 13, at 681; see also POSNER, supra note 156, at 73-74.
167. See Duxbury, supra note 13, at 679; Sunstein, supra note 146, at 878-79 (linking the
Lochner Court's notion of maximum-hour legislation as nonneutral and partisan with Wechsler's
notion of neutral principles as those which enforce the status quo); Peller, supra note 13, at 607-
08 (drawing a similar parallel to Lochner and noting that Wechsler's inquiry into the Brown
opinion assumed that existing patterns of racial subordination were a given and thus beyond the
province of the judiciary). Morton Horwitz argues that this is the effect of the effort to separate
law from politics-the equation of politics with change, and legality with the status-quo-
enforcing. HORWrrZ, supra note 49, at 266. But see Fallon, supra note 13, at 975 (suggesting that
legal process methodology need not necessarily be a conservative force).
168. See GREY, supra note 10, at 17 (discussing the epistemic claim that coherence is derived
from the mutually reinforcing nature of coherent elements). It would not be entirely accurate to
call the field, even in its "ideal" process school conception, a closed system. As Wechsler himself
asserted, neutral principles will not guarantee a just result. If a decision meets the criteria for
neutrality, "the other and the harder questions of its rightness and its wisdom must be faced."
Herbert Wechsler, The Nature of Judicial Reasoning, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: A SYMPOSIUM
290, 299 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964). He did not specify how such decisions would be identified.
169. Jeremy Waldron, "Transcendental Nonsense" and System in the Law, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 16, 21, 50 (2000).
170. Id. at 45 (discussing a complacency about the "tautologies of 'policy' and nostrums of
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This well describes the problem with the premises of the legal process
conception of the field of federal courts. To begin with, the undefended
assumptions that define the concerns of the field are then used to address
those concerns. Next, the system further reinforces its own internal
coherence and wards off criticism by placing off-limits the very data that
might challenge the essentialist and unexamined assumptions undergirding
the field. According to the rules of the field, such data is itself insufficiently
neutral and principled. The most obvious such assumption is that of the
existence and nature of the consensus about democracy. But in particular,
the field's crucial minor premises-that legislatures are representative and
democratic institutions that protect societal values, for example-are highly
formalized. Inquiries into the actual institutional competence of the
branches of government, and the actual results of the prescribed allocation
of decisionmaking power, were avoided, perhaps viewed as insufficiently
immanent, or too keyed to particular outcomes.'72 Inquiries about whether
justice is actually being served in particular cases under the current regime
may look too time-sensitive, too ad hoc, too result-oriented. The broader
and more timeless the abstraction, the more neutral it appears.'73
In retrospect it may seem ironic-given the formalism implicit in the
notion of neutral principlesl'a-that the underlying legal process
assumptions of the field were based on a sophisticated understanding of the
realist critique of classical formalism. Legal process theory attempted to
maintain the rule of law despite the unavoidable fact of judicial discretion.
It sought to give judges the latitude to check democratic excesses but not
the freedom to impose their own values. The constraint on imposition of
values, the duty to engage in reasoned elaboration that would generate
neutral principles-like the earlier duty to understand the Constitution in
accordance with common-law principles judicially filtered through "right
reason" -has the appearance of constraint only to the extent its implicit
governing assumptions are shared.175 In this way, the concept of neutral
principles replicates the problem of classical formalism that it sought to
address.
172. See POSNER, supra note 156, at 74 (asserting that Wechsler "forbids courts to inquire
into the actual competence of the legislature-he assigns spheres of competence in an empirical
void"); see also Fallon, supra note 13, at 977 (suggesting that large abstractions can ossify into
neutral principles, and that the antidote is empirical research to see if ideas actually work in
practice).
173. See HORWTZ, supra note 49, at 262 (discussing the means by which the development of
abstract and formal legal categories suppresses particularized equitable inquiries in order to
promote the rule of law).
174. See Friedman, supra note 165, at 519 (noting that "Wechsler's approach, to those
critical of it, bore too much similarity to the now bad old days of arid legal formalism").
175. See GREY, supra note 10, at 7-8 (noting that the traditional conception of common law
as "judicially filtered 'right reason' assumed a correspondence of common-law principles,
natural rights, and dictates of sound political economy).
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In raising the specter of formalism, I recognize that the term is a
moving target. The characteristics of formalism are a topic of intense
debate. 76 Particularly before the recent revival of formalism, 177 the term
often seemed to serve mainly as an epithet, a means of critiquing disfavored
results or methodologies.178 I do not desire to enter this fray. My use of the
term "formalism" to describe and critique certain attributes common to the
neutral principles doctrine and to the New Federalism is meant to denote
two general characteristics often attributed to the term. The first
characteristic is determinacy, "roughly the view that a unique answer in a
particular case can be conclusively derived from application of a general
rule." '79 As Fred Schauer observes, the effort to place consideration of
certain variables beyond the judge's jurisdiction, while a characteristic of
formalism, is also a characteristic of the rule of law itself. Rules, as Schauer
observes, "achieve their 'ruleness' precisely by ... screening off from a
decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would otherwise take
into account." 8's Law achieves a certain amount of predictability and
coherence by denying the decisionmaker the power to acknowledge factors
not allowed for by the rule.' Thus in one respect, the debate about whether
a decision is too formalistic is a debate about whether certain variables were
improperly placed beyond the decisionmaker's power of decision. The first
problem of formalism, as I use the term herein, is that it overstates the
amount of predictability and coherence that law can achieve, and the extent
to which coherence can be achieved by limiting the universe of allowable
considerations. The problem, that is, lies in the assumption that answers can
ever be derived from rules automatically, or inexorably, without
supplementary value judgments.
The second problem of formalism that I wish to highlight, generally
one with more derogatory implications, derives not so much from the
choice to place certain variables off-limits, but from "its denial of the
176. See, e.g., SEBOK, supra note 13, at 49 (observing that the term is used in many different
and almost inconsistent ways); Schauer, supra note 133, at 509-10 (noting the same).
177. See generally GREY, supra note 10 (discussing the New Formalism); Ernest J. Weinrib,
Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988) (offering a
prominent articulation of the New Formalism).
178. See SEBOK, supra note 13, at 57 (noting this phenomenon); Schauer, supra note 133, at
510 (observing that according to the literature, "whatever formalism is, it is not good").
179. Radin, supra note 141, at 792. Radin describes this as, roughly speaking, the view
associated with traditional formalism. Thomas Grey argues that classical formalism held that law
has three requirements: It must be determinate (with judgment following uncontestably from
application of norm to facts); it must be systematic (forming a coherent structure); and it must be
autonomous (deriving norms from distinctly legal sources). GREY, supra note 10, at 5.
180. Schauer, supra note 133, at 510.
181. Id. at 540.
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political, moral, social, and economic choices involved in the decision, and
indeed in its denial that there was any choice at all." 182
The legal process school's brand of formalism partook of both these
characteristics. Its goal was to remove, as much as possible, moral and
political choices from the realm of judicial decisionmaking. It sought to
preserve the rule of law and to create a coherent and autonomous system by
placing considerations it deemed political, such as the normative
acceptability of the consequences of judicial decisions, outside the judicial
realm. It overstated the extent to which these purportedly extraneous
normative considerations could be removed from the judicial realm. It also
denied the normative choices involved in attempting to remove moral and
political considerations from judging.
The notion of federalism that operated as the central organizing
principle for the field of federal courts was assumed to be principled
because it was, in theory, unconcerned with outcome and capable of
consistent application over time, despite changes in the character of the
institutions themselves or in the prevailing concerns of the age.' It was
presented as not just a neutral principle, the substantive results of whose
"proper" application were assumed to be just, but as a first principle, albeit
an unexamined one. It went unacknowledged that the process school's
conception of federalism was necessarily animated by particular values,
based on a particular vision of federal-state relations, and shaped by its
political and social context.184
It was, therefore, completely predictable that the legal process school
would lose the battle to reconcile Brown v. Board of Education'85 and its
progeny with the methodological tenets of neutral principles.186 The
dramatic shifts in jurisdictional doctrine during the civil rights era, leading
to a dramatic broadening of federal court availability for civil-rights
claimants, could not be explained without reference to an evolution in
values.187 There were no neutral principles that would condemn the Lochner
182. Id. at 511 (discussing, in particular, the meaning of the charge that the Lochner decision
was formalistic).
183. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 246-54.
184. In Purcell's view, at least, this conception of federalism was meant to advance a
"sophisticated version of judicial nationalism." Id. at 249. Although this is debatable, the
principle was certainly assumed to rest on a particular notion of consensus. See supra text
accompanying notes 152-172.
185. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
186. See Wechsler, supra note 12, at 31 (asserting agreement with the result in Brown but
raising problems with its methodology); Friedman, supra note 165, at 516 (noting that Wechsler's
problems reconciling Brown's result and methodology "went to the very heart of the legal
system's legitimacy"); Wells, supra note 4, at 136 & n.259 (citing the negative scholarly reaction
of process theorists toward Warren Court opinions).
187. Thus, until quite recently, Hart and Wechsler's casebook was rightly criticized for
failing to incorporate adequately the developments of the civil rights era. E.g., Amar, supra note
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Court's role in shaping a particular conception of federalism as illegitimate
while exonerating the Warren Court's role in Brown. '88 It was a comparison
between radically different conceptions of federalism, and any judgment
would rest, ultimately, on the moral and political acceptability of those
conceptions over time.
If I am correct that federalism is a concept that is necessarily animated
by particular values, the difficult question about federalism is whether the
concept is capable of providing any sort of coherence or at least linkage
across time. Jeremy Waldron talks about one value of abstract concepts:
They can act as what he calls "flags of systematicity."l19 They alert the
audience that a concept is part of a broader linkage, that there is cross-
cutting among doctrinal elements that must be taken into account when new
law is made.19 It is possible that the term "federalism" should serve just
such a function, alerting the audience to the complex web of doctrine
concerning federal-state relations and advising jurists to consider particular
decisions in light of that complex web. The problem arises when the term
"federalism" is asked to carry a heavier load-when it is assumed to
provide a determinate answer to any particular question of federal-state
relations.
As I argue below, this denial of choice is precisely the vice of the New
Federalism. Any conception of federalism must be animated by particular
values, because the concept is pervasively indeterminate. 9 ' As Fred
Schauer explains about such concepts:
It is not that such terms have no content whatsoever; it is that every
application, every concretization, every instantiation requires the
addition of supplementary premises to apply the general term to
specific cases. Therefore, any application of that term that denies
the choice made among various eligible supplementary premises is
formalistic in this sense.
192
This recognition does not require the conclusion that concepts like
federalism are merely empty incantations to be deployed cynically.'93
Political theorist Edward S. Corwin has observed that to "[t]he average
13, at 702-14 (noting that Hart and Wechsler did not properly incorporate the jurisprudence of the
civil rights era into their casebook until the third edition in 1988).
188. See supra note 155 (discussing the scholarly obsession with finding a theory that would
explain both Brown and Lochner).
189. Waldron, supra note 169, at 23.
190. See id.
191. Thomas Grey explains that for law to be determinate, "its judgments [must follow] from
the application of norms to facts, without the exercise of discretion or contestable judgment."
GREY, supra note 10, at 5.
192. Schauer, supra note 133, at 514 (citations omitted).
193. For an excellent discussion of the importance of both realist insights and the study of
legal materials, see GiLLMAN, supra note 21, at 196-98.
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Supreme Court judge.., such phrases as the separation of powers, check
and balance, judicial independence, national supremacy, states' rights,
freedom of contract ... not only express important realities, they are
realities-they are forms of thought with a vitality and validity of their
own." 194
But to say that the notion of federalism is one a Supreme Court Justice
does or should take seriously is not to say that the Justice must accept a
particular version of federalism. The indeterminacy of the concept leads to
the opposite conclusion. Such a concept cannot have a fixed, timeless, or
inexorable meaning. The seductive pull of a broad abstraction like
federalism is that it appears "general and evaluative enough to provide a
plausible gapless grid" "' that unifies a complex and unruly field. But any
concept that general, as Thomas Grey points out, "tend[s] to be fuzzy and
interpretively contestable." '96 Any articulation of federalism that suggests
inexorability is one that papers over both the fact that other choices were
available and the fact that the chosen version was deemed preferable
according to values other than simply because "'it' is in the
Constitution." 197
The reasons why articulations of federalism so often deny choice are
complex. One such reason, discussed at some length above,' 9 is that
judges, operating within their own set of cultural assumptions, may not
fully grasp the extent of the choice that they make. They may assume that
the abstraction really does correspond to some "underlying and
noncontingent reality [and therefore that] certain specific embodiments are
necessarily part of that reality." 99 For example, Justice Brewer's deeply
held beliefs about the correspondence among law, morality, and religion
strongly influenced his view of the role of the federal courts in a way that
no doubt seemed quite logical and principled to him."°° If one of the vices
of formalism is the deception inherent in its masking of choice,2"' often the
194. Id. at 198 (quoting EDWARD S. CORWIN, Constitution v. Constitutional Theory: The
Question of the States v. the Nation, in AMERIcAN CONSTrruTIONAL HISTORY: ESSAYS BY
EDWARD S. CORWIN 99, 104-05 (Alpheus T. Mason & Gerald Garvey eds., 1964)).
195. GREY, supra note 10, at 9.
196. Id.; see also Rubin & Feeley, supra note 8, at 910 n.38 (stating that words like
federalism are "generally webs of meaning, rather than having a simple, sharply circumscribed
definition"); Shane, supra note 21, at 227 ("Legal categories like 'federalism' are especially
amenable to divergences of meaning.").
197. Jackson, supra note 8, at 2215; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 154
(1992) (holding that the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 violated
the requisites of federalism); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463-64 (1991) (holding the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 inapplicable to state employees, based on a
presumption created by principles of federalism).
198. Supra text accompanying notes 142-148.
199. Schauer, supra note 133, at 513.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
201. Schauer, supra note 133, at 513.
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vice seems to be a species of self-deception that is difficult to distinguish
from a widely shared human attribute-the tendency to assume that one's
own experience is, if not universal, then at least generalizable.
To complicate matters further, even judges who accept a pragmatic and
dynamic vision of federalism may choose to articulate such a vision in more
abstract terms. Robert Ferguson explains the use of judicial formalism as
"not just a legal philosophy that can be put aside" but an "innate
psychological impulse, ' ' 02 an integral part of the genre of the legal
opinion." 3 He argues that judges adopt the "rhetoric of inevitability" 204 as a
way to reassure the reader that they are rising above normal human
predilections, and that their conclusions are compelled by logic, to
"convince a democratic society that independent judges work within the
spirit of justice for all."205 Judges feel the powerful pull of the expectations
of the genre. They may employ abstract formulations because it is expected,
and because it is strategically useful. Such strategies are not necessarily
objectionable; 2° but neither are they inevitable. 27 Judicial language that
admits innovation or choice would sound less incongruous if judges
employed it more often.0 8
Moreover, the strategy of relying on abstract formulations often is
objectionable, for example, when it is employed for pernicious ends.
Federalism is a term that serves as an indelible reminder2° of the dangers of
202. Ferguson, supra note 10, at 208.
203. Laura Little argues that this impulse is particularly strong in the field of federal courts,
in which courts are reordering the balance of power and at times expanding their own power.
Little, supra note 149, at 135.
204. Ferguson, supra note 10, at 213.
205. Id. at 208.
206. Lessig, for example, argues that the appearance of consistency is critical to the
maintenance of judicial authority and that judges ought to adopt a strategy of using formalism as a
conscious tool. Lessig, supra note 26, at 174-75. Contra David Shapiro, Jurisdiction and
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985) (arguing for the importance of candid articulation of
criteria for judicial discretion); Wells, supra note 4, at 138-39 (arguing that lack of judicial candor
encourages cynicism).
207. As Robert Cover said about the choice of the antislavery judges to employ abstractions:
"Alternative articulations were available-articulations that gave the formal structure more down-
to-earth, instrumental justifications, that stressed the inevitable and desirable role of the judge and
of policy input in decision making, and that gave the judiciary a more explicit role as conjoint
legislator." ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
237 (1975). But see SEBOK, supra note 13, at 49-57 (discussing Cover's treatment of
Massachusetts Supreme Court Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw and exploring the possibility that
Justice Shaw's philosophy could be characterized as antiformalist).
208. Ferguson, supra note 10, at 218 (suggesting the possibility of a new language that
incorporates activism and innovation into the genre of the legal opinion).
209. Some commentators argue that the indelible reminder of the use of federalism norms in
defense of slavery has served as a barrier to realizing the more legitimate alms of federalism. E.g.,
Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1804 (1995) (explaining that
the invocation of federalism "came to be seen as a euphemistic pretext for the support of slavery
and racially discriminatory practices"); see also SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 7 (noting the
arguments by some scholars that appeals to federalism "were little more than the last refuge of a
scoundrel"); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 384-85 (1997)
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jurisdictional principle deployed as a socially acceptable cover for the
insulation of unacceptable substantive ends.210 Robert Cover, in his study of
the antislavery judges who felt themselves bound to enforce the fugitive
slave laws, noted that a judge faced with a conflict between moral and
formal values would often select as norms "those articulations of the
process and its limits that invoked the highest possible justifications for
formalism; that described the process in the most mechanistic terms; and
that emphasized the place of others in the decisional process." 1'
But the deeper problem is that in masking the assumptions and value
judgments that inevitably shape decisionmaking, abstract norms insulate
those judgments from public debate. They therefore deprive both the
judiciary and the community at large of the opportunity to test them against
community norms, or for that matter, actual conditions. Such strategies may
also backfire. The coded understandings behind a term like "federalism" in
one era are unlikely to survive to the next. As a means of insuring
principled and just adjudication, abstract norms like federalism are
unreliable, and indeed seductively dangerous. Abstract norms ossify, lose
their original moorings, disguise their organizing assumptions, and begin to
look timeless. They begin to substitute for individual equitable concerns,
empirical inquiries, and other means of determining whether substantive
justice continues to be served. 212
C. The New Federalism: Sacrificing Principle for the Illusion of
Coherence
One important insight to be gleaned from Purcell's history is that no
particular version of federalism can credibly claim to be timeless or
immanent. The contingency of the concept has lately become easier to see.
As the circumstances of the demise of Lochner and Swift illustrate,
allocational principles look neutral only until those who assess them
become self-conscious about their sources, effects, and political natures.
The current judicial battles over the allocation of federal power, and the
meaning of federalism in particular, reveal not only a fundamental absence
of shared moral consensus, but fundamentally conflicting ideological
(arguing that for those who came of age during the civil rights era, the memory of the use of
federalism as a cover for opposition to desegregation may pose a barrier to thinking clearly about
federalism).
210. One of the more notorious recent examples of a retreat to mechanistic formalism was
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), in which a capital
defense lawyer missed the filing deadline for a state habeas petition by two days, and the Supreme
Court rejected the litigant's claim that his attorney's error should constitute cause excusing his
default. In O'Connor's opinion, permitting the execution to go forward, she began: "This is a case
about federalism." Id. at 726.
211. See COVER, supra note 207, at 237.
212. Bandes, supra note 25, at 1314-17.
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frameworks. 213 Not only questions of judicial oversight of the commerce
power that appeared to have been settled since 1937, but questions as basic
as whether the Constitution's authority derives from the states or the people
of the Nation--questions that some argue hark back not only to the Lochner
era2 4  but to the debate over the Articles of Confederation215-are
generating heated debate. There is a general sense that we are in the midst
of a major shift in federal-state relations, and few are agnostic about
whether the shift is well-advised or warranted. Of course, as Purcell's book
nicely illustrates, it is unusual for conflicts about jurisdiction to capture the
public imagination." 6 Linda Greenhouse recently observed that the current
constitutional developments, despite their potentially enormous
significance, have been unfolding largely outside the realm of public
discussion, though that could change as high-profile substantive issues like
the Violence Against Women Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act
217
are implicated.2 18 But at least among jurists and academics, this is hardly a
time of consensus, 219 but rather a time in which the content and uses of
federalism are highly contested. It is, in short, an opportune time to
reconsider the issue of what a principled federalism might look like when
comfortable assumptions about consensus are unavailable.
The Supreme Court's New Federalism is problematic in both of the
senses I described in my earlier discussion of formalism.22 First, it
213. See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and
Innovation, 22.WM. & MARY L. REv. 639, 662-64 (1983) (discussing the problem of conflicting
ideological templates, or "universes of discourse").
214. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1759 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting);
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 701 (1999)
(Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 690-91; Nowak, supra note 21, at 1094; Suzanna Sherry, States Are
People Too, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1128 (2000).
215. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Pledging a New Allegiance: An Essay on Sovereignty and
the New Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1133, 1137 (2000); Shane, supra note 21, at 210.
216. See, for example, his discussion on the difficulty of mobilizing support for the abolition
of diversity jurisdiction at PURCELL, supra note 1, at 77-85.
217. The Supreme Court heard arguments on October 11, 2000, on the issue of whether the
Eleventh Amendment bars private damage suits against unconsenting states for violating the
Americans with Disabilities Act. Charles Lane, Disabilities Act Challenge Divides Court, WASH.
POST, Oct. 12, 2000, at A15. The case is University of Alabama Board of Trustees v. Garrett, No.
99-1240.
218. Linda Greenhouse, Battle on Federalism: In an Era of States' Rights Debates, High
Court's Ruling Limits Congress, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2000, at Al8. Thus the Tenth Amendment,
Eleventh Amendment, and Commerce Clause debates probably do not qualify as "contested" in
the sense Lessig refers to, as at the forefront of public debate. Lessig, supra note 49, at 1807. As
this Book Review was going to press, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Bush v. Gore,
121 S. Ct. 525 (2000). This decision, needless to say, may do much to place previously obscure
procedural issues of federal-state relations into the realm of public discourse.
219. It is also likely that legal scholars have become more sophisticated about the limits of
the very notion of consensus-whom it includes and whose exclusion goes unnoticed. It is a
hopeful thought that scholars are simply more aware of heterogeneity and therefore more skeptical
of the claim that a norm is widely shared. See KALMAN, supra note 5, at 245 (citing Jean-Franqois
Lyotard's claim that "consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value").
220. See supra text accompanying notes 176-182.
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overstates the determinacy of the concept of federalism and the possibility
of deriving inexorable conclusions from the concept. Second, it denies the
need to defend the principles on which it is premised. It is, of course, based
on particular-and, in my view, unfortunate---choices about the balance of
federal and state power. Its choices, on the whole, have tended to create
barriers to federal governmental protection of the rights of individuals.22'
Whether the Court has chosen wisely is debatable; whether it has chosen at
all is not. I suggest the limits of the Court's approach with a brief
consideration of two areas of federalism in which it has been especially
prolific: the Commerce Clause and the Eleventh Amendment.
The Court's pre-1937 Commerce Clause jurisprudence struck down
federal legislation under the Commerce Clause by relying on distinctions-
which are in retrospect inevitably characterized as "formalist
distinctions" 222-between commerce and police power,223 direct effects and
indirect effects,224 that which was in the stream of commerce and that which
was outside it." When these distinctions ceased to sound credible and were
abandoned,226 the Court entered a period, nearly sixty years long, during
which it is only a slight exaggeration to say that the Court simply ceased to
impose judicial limits on the commerce power at all. 27 In the view of one
group of scholars, this hands-off judicial approach was and remains entirely
appropriate,"' since, in these scholars' view, the breadth of Congress's
power to regulate the states under the Commerce Clause ought to be
resolved by the political branches.
221. See, e.g., Shane, supra note 21, at 239 (making this point).
222. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1759 (2000) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Friedman, supra note 209, at 333; Lessig, supra note 26, at 175.
223. E.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1895); see also Friedman, supra
note 209, at 332-33 (discussing the Court's creation of formal distinctions in order to cabin the
commerce power).
224. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935);
Friedman, supra note 209, at 384-85.
225. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 543.
226. See Lessig, supra note 26, at 175.
227. Friedman, supra note 209, at 334-35; Lessig, supra note 26, at 154.
228. A recent influential article advancing this argument is Larry D. Kramer, Putting the
Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 215 (2000), which
argues that the states are well represented by Congress and do not need protection from the
judiciary. Herbert Wechsler most famously made this argument. Herbert Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); see also Jackson, supra note 8, at 2215-16
(discussing this argument). There are other arguments that lead to the same conclusion that the
courts have no role to play in enforcing federalism constraints. E.g., Rubin & Feeley, supra note
8, at 909 (arguing that the concept of federalism is a poor substitute for more legitimate values
like decentralization and itself fails to articulate any legitimate goals for judicial enforcement).
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Other scholars argue that the Court should exercise oversight in the
Commerce Clause area." 9 Vicki Jackson, for example, argues that the rule
of law demands some form of a judicial check on congressional power. In
her view, the absence of any judicial role would deprive the law in the area
of any claim to be principled or consistent and would be profoundly
destablilizing.23° As she recognizes, there is an inherent tension in the
notion of principled adjudication of the norms of federalism. Jackson
characterizes federalism as "quintessentially, a political deal among
different governments. Workability is its core. It is a means to many ends,
the most basic of which is the stable survival of the union it creates. To be
successful, federalism must be pragmatic and it must be dynamic." 3'
For those who see federalism as a pragmatic and fluid concept, a belief
in the need for judicial oversight necessarily implicates the tension between
this fluidity and the doctrinal consistency, or "ruleness," that is a key
component of the rule of law. A pragmatic, judicially enforceable
federalism is one that is keyed to the advancement of the values of
federalism. Although the precise identity of these values will be debated,
any such values will tend to be articulated at a fairly high level of
generality, for example, "accountability" or "public participation in
democracy" or "diffusion of power to protect liberty." 232 If oversight of the
commerce power is keyed to a pragmatic inquiry into whether national
regulation addressing particular problems would advance the values of
federalism,233 the results of such inquiries are bound to vary over time and
according to substance. The attempt to impose doctrinal consistency on
such a fluid and pragmatic series of judgments will inevitably require the
imposition, rather than the discovery, of a consistent doctrinal framework.
This recognition that doctrinal consistency would need to be imposed
rather than found by no means invalidates the enterprise. The creation of a
coherent story, including the story of the "rule of law," is always, to some
extent, artificial. It necessarily requires the erasure or simplification of
certain contingencies, the use of abstractions that disguise certain
distinctions and choices. If courts are to have some role in regulating the
commerce power, the challenge in constructing a principled jurisprudence
is in determining how much doctrinal consistency is necessary and what
ought to be traded off to achieve it. Ideally, courts would engage in such
determinations fully aware of the choices before them and would articulate
229. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 24, at 746-47 (arguing that antifederalists are justified in
looking for some judicially enforceable principles of state sovereignty, though nationalists are
justified in questioning their doctrinal means of achieving this goal).
230. Jackson, supra note 8, at 2224-26.
231. Id. at 2228-55 (discussing federalism in relation to the Commerce Clause, the
anticommandeering principle, and generally).
232. Friedman, supra note 209, at 386-405.
233. Id. at 336-38.
[Vol. 110: 829
Erie and the History of the One True Federalism
those choices. This would permit a more democratic dialogue on the
desirability of the choices made and would also facilitate reassessment of
their desirability as conditions change.
But history teaches that the impulse to formalism is strong, and that a
flexible jurisprudence that recognizes and articulates value choices is a
threatening specter because it fails to reassure us that judging transcends
politics. History also teaches that the formalisms jurists employ to create
that reassuring illusion do not always look like formalisms at the time. The
problem with the current Court's reversion to a highly formalist approach to
federalism is that, although the Lochner-era judges may well have believed
their Commerce Clause jurisprudence was found, not made, it is now too
late in the day to claim ignorance of the choices involved.
United States v. Lopez,2 4 the first case since the New Deal to strike
down a federal enactment as beyond the commerce power, did so by
creating a three-part categorical test to determine when Congress may use
its commerce power.235 The majority opinion in United States v.
Morrison,"3 striking down portions of the Violence Against Women Act,
explicitly rests its decision on its responsibility to police the boundary
between the "truly national and the truly local."237 The opinions in Lopez
and Morrison assume, as the dissent in the Morrison case correctly
observes, a formal and categorical distinction between commerce and the
realm of moral and social wrongs,23 a "sacred province of state autonomy"
divorced from the needs and failings of the political process.239
The assertion that there is an immutable and obvious boundary between
the truly national and the truly local, and that judicial policing of this
boundary is "required by the Constitution," 240 essentially treats the period
from 1937241 to 1995242 as a doctrinal anomaly. It also rather resolutely
ignores the lesson of 1937-that appearances of what is required by the
Constitution can be deceptive, and that the Court must guard against the
234. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (voiding the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
235. Congress may use its commerce power only if its action fits into one of three categories:
regulating interstate commerce; regulating instrumentalities of interstate commerce; or regulating
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. id. at 558-59.
236. 120 S. Ct. 1740(2000).
237. Id. at 1754.
238. Id. at 1764 (Souter, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 1778 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 1749.
241. E.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (greatly expanding the
definition of interstate commerce, thereby calling into serious question the distinction between the
truly national and the truly local); see also Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce
Clause: Life After Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 801, 802 (1996) (discussing this shift in
doctrine).
242. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (reviving the judicially enforceable
distinction between national and local for purposes of the Commerce Clause).
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temptation to assume that its own assessments are widely held.243 The
Court's assertion is thus hard to credit as stemming from a belief that the
Court is accurately describing a politically or judicially discernible
boundary that is consistent across time. It is hard to accept despite the
Court's claim that to police this boundary is necessary to "preserve one of
the few principles that has been consistent since the Clause was
adopted.2 Instead, such policing appears to be an effort to recapture a
long-lost balance.245 But rather than explain why the old balance is worth
recapturing, or why a principled and coherent federalism requires the
revival of such categorical distinctions, the Court invokes yet more tradition
to buttress its claim.
The Court relies on the "sensible and traditional understanding" 246 that
there must be some judicially enforced limit to congressional power under
the Commerce Clause. The Court also defends the need for such a
distinction by invoking the fear that the statute will interfere with the
"traditional" exclusion of family law from the realm of federal
regulation.247 The repeated invocation of tradition, implicit constitutional
requisites, and essential distinctions, coupled with the failure to consider
either the historical reasons for such distinctions or whether those reasons
ought to animate current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, is a message that
the Court believes those considerations are off the table. Rules are rules,
regardless of whether they accurately describe the current polity, advance
currently viable policies, or lead to desirable consequences.
This is an interpretation of the Constitution that privileges tradition and
coherence above all else. In order to maintain this hierarchy of values, the
interpreter must choose a certain version of history and then declare inquiry
into the forces shaping that version of history-or into the existence of
other versions-off-limits. In placing such heavy reliance on formalist
notions of what is traditional and essential, with so little examination of
when or why these traditions took hold, and whether they are worth
maintaining, the Court denies that it makes such choices, and deprives those
affected by its decisions of any opportunity to evaluate them. The Court
never seeks to defend its notion that its version of federalism is required, or
beyond the realm of choice. And as I have argued, the notion of a
243. Purcell's history illustrates the ease with which the bar may conflate its own interests
with those of the nation. See PURCELL, supra note 1, at 29, 249, 273-83. Assumptions about the
inherently local nature of family law may be difficult for federal judges to separate from their own
notions of what sorts of cases are worthy of their time and commensurate with their prestige. See
Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts,
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1687-88, 1695-98 (1992).
244. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1754.
245. Lessig, supra note 26, at 129.
246. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1765 (Souter, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 1753.
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federalism that requires no justification is not defensible. Federalism in
itself is a term incapable of such determinative force. It is not a rule from
which judgments can follow inexorably, without the imposition of
contested value choices. 8
In placing an evaluation of the traditions of federalism off-limits, the
Court short-circuits any examination of the traditions it so freely invokes.
As Reva Siegel,249 Judith Resnik,25 and other scholars25 have shown, these
traditions have questionable roots that are instead worth repudiating.
Although in the debates about the Violence Against Women Act the
rhetoric of federalism has replaced earlier rhetorical justifications for
insulating domestic violence from judicial intervention, the federalism
arguments themselves "acquire persuasive power as they draw on the
traditional modes of reasoning about intimate assault." " The Court in
Morrison embraces a notion of federalism that views domestic violence,
including rape and battery, as a species of "family law," and family law as
a category that is both "truly local" and an area " of traditional state
regulation." 25 3 Judith Resnik observes that "the equation of women with
the family... derive[s] from nineteenth-century images"; there is nothing
"intrinsic" or "natural" about it.254 As she notes, these jurisdictional rules
were constructed to exclude domestic violence from federal court and
characterize it as local through reasoning echoing that which once excluded
it from the protection of law entirely.255
The Court's approach also short-circuits consideration of the central
practical inquiry: whether domestic violence is a problem that ought to be
addressed on the federal level. There has been substantial evidence adduced
that the Violence Against Women Act has, since 1994, led to significant
improvement in the governmental response to violence against women, and
to a noticeable drop in the incidence of such violence.256 If the Court
248. The desire to maintain the rule of law might itself be a value supporting a consistent
judicial conception of federalism. See Jackson, supra note 8, at 2224. However, this is an
instrumental argument to consider coherence, stability, equal treatment and other values advanced
by the rule of law. As such, it ought to be considered along with competing values.
249. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2201 (1996).
250. Resnik, supra note 243.
251. E.g., Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L.
REv. 1073 (1994); Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L.
REv. 1297 (1998). Contra Dailey, supra note 209, at 1825 (arguing that state authority over
family law is an essential feature of our liberal constitutional order).
252. Siegel, supra note 249, at 2201. For example, they exhort deference to the traditional
allocation of federal and state responsibilities, despite the fact that many of the assumptions
driving that allocation are now unconstitutional or widely considered repugnant.
253. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1753-54 (2000).
254. Resnik, supra note 243, at 1698; see also Siegel, supra note 249, at 2200-06 (tracing the
historical antecedents of the relegation of family issues to the local or private sphere).
255. Resnik, supra note 243, at 1739-50.
256. See, e.g., Liberty Aldrich, Sneak Attack on VAWA, NATION, Oct. 2, 2000, at 6.
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believes that such factual inquiries are beyond its competence, the
conclusion may be that these factual inquiries are better left to Congress. If
the Court believes that such factual inquiries are unnecessary, because the
line between national and local concerns is historically fixed, or because
maintaining such a line is more important than asking whether it has been
drawn correctly, the Court's refusal to defend these beliefs and take
responsibility for the consequences of their application is, quite simply,
unprincipled.
The formalism of the Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence is, if
possible, even more categorical. This formalism relies on an expansive
version of sovereign immunity whose claimed immanence is such that it
supersedes the limitations imposed by the language of the Constitution, and
trumps, without any justification beyond its existence, weighty
countervailing principles like governmental accountability and the
supremacy of federal law. 57  The Court has done much to
"denationalize" 25 8 systematic federal protection of core federal rights, and
has done so without acknowledging that the importance of according
federal protection to such rights ought to be part of the equation. Its
jurisprudence has justifiably been called frightening for its lack of concern
for text, 59 its increasing imperviousness to legislative correction, 260 and its
questionable use of history.26' Implicit in the Court's formalism is the
message that the Court is choiceless, bound by longstanding and enduring
principle regardless of substantive outcome, and despite the costs to
257. As David Shapiro succinctly puts it:
For the Court to take a concept that has little justification in itself, to constitutionalize
it, to use it as a vehicle for a possible assault on several fundamental Fourteenth
Amendment doctrines, including a direct attack on the recognition of statutory
entitlements as property, and to strike down three acts of Congress in one day on three
different grounds (when only two acts of Congress were invalidated before the Civil
War) is the opposite of either moderation or good federalism.
Shapiro, supra note 21, at 759-60 (footnote omitted).
258. Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity, and the
Denationalization of Federal Law, 31 RUTGERS LJ. 691 (2000).
259. The Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence, which forbids damage actions in both
federal and state court by citizens against their own states, though the language of the Eleventh
Amendment prohibits neither, derives from the Eleventh Amendment "not so much for what it
says, but for the presupposition ... which it confirms." Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 729
(1999); see James E. Pfander, Once More unto the Breach: Eleventh Amendment Scholarship and
the Court, 75 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 817, 821 (2000) (arguing that the Court treats the text of the
Eleventh Amendment as irrelevant); Sherry, supra note 214, at 1128 (same).
260. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999) (limiting Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to authorize
suits against state governments where state remedies have not been held inadequate); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (restricting the power of Congress to enforce rights more
broadly than the Court would); see also Farber, supra note 215, at 1055-56 (noting the
constriction of the power of Congress under Boerne).
261. Farber, supra note 215, at 1144 (arguing that the Court reads "text, history, and
precedent" through "the lens of [its] constitutional faith"); Nowak, supra note 21, at 1099-105
(contending that the Court is incorrect in its treatment of history).
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fairness and other subservient values. 26 Scholars have increasingly
described the Court's commitment to its understanding of the principle
of state sovereignty in terms like "reverential, 263 "resistant to analysis
,264 " 265 " ,266 t 267' nand critique," shocking," " intuitive, cavalier," and
"surprising." 2 68 As the string of adjectives suggests, the majority exhibits a
commitment to its particular notion of sovereign immunity that has a
fervent, emotional quality to it (and that has elicited similarly strong
emotion in response). It has declared off-limits all considerations but one:
original intent. The moral, political, historical, and constitutional choices
inherent in the Court's decision to rely solely on original intent,269 and on
the particular and highly contested version of that intent to which the Court
subscribes,' are denied.
In short, the use of an abstract notion of federalism shorn of historical
context may appear to provide coherence across time, but the appearance is
deceptive and dangerous. The abstract notion of federalism merely drives
the influence of history underground and deprives all those affected of the
opportunity to decide whether any particular version of federalism ought to
retain its hold. It would be more sensible to look to history for help
identifying the forces that have shaped and reshaped the notion of
federalism over time. But legal doctrinal analysis also has conventions and
demands of its own, and the question is how these ought to coexist with the
notion of historical and social contingency. That is, can the judicial system
be "opened up," can it afford to acknowledge more variables, more
fluidity, more responsibility for choice, without sacrificing its authority?
More specifically, is it possible to construct a principled federalism that
acknowledges such contingencies? Is there a role for a functional
federalism that presents itself, not as immutable, but as the best way to
262. Here, too, this assertion is not an accurate description of a timeless principle, since it
involves treating "the period from 1959-1996 as anomalous" and relying instead on the
"inglorious period" from 1887 to 1934. Jackson, supra note 258, at 700-01.
263. Farber, supra note 215, at 1135.
264. Id. at 1144.
265. Nowak, supra note 21, at 1096.
266. Pfander, supra note 259, at 832.
267. Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory,
75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1011, 1056 (2000).
268. Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 953, 959 (2000).
269. See Schauer, supra note 133, at 513 & n.9 (calling the decision to rely on a particular
interpretation of original intent, when intent does not provide a definitive answer, formalistic).
270. There is a vast and impressive body of scholarly commentary suggesting that the Court's
version is incorrect. E.g., William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a
Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983).
In any case, the Court's version is certainly contested.
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achieve an articulated set of goals at a particular time in history, or under a
particular set of circumstances?
D. Principled Pragmatism: Piercing the Formalisms
A functional notion of federalism makes particular sense, since notions
of what is inherently national or local are themselves time-bound and
fluid.271 Purcell's account illustrates the ebb and flow of the concept of the
proper division of federal and state power, and the complex array of forces
that help shape it. As he shows, uniformity was needed at particular
junctures, for particular purposes. The federal courts were strengthened and
law was centralized intermittently in response to particular pressures,
ranging from great historical and political forces to interest group politics.
The drive for uniformity was impelled, at times, by the national need for
economic and commercial growth, the expansionist interests of the
railroads, the need to protect civil rights, the interests of elites like the bar
(including the Supreme Court itself)72 and the legal academy: interests both
national and particular, and often a mixture of the two. As Purcell's account
illustrates, "[t]he adversaries chose their formalisms accordingly,
273
portraying their positions as timeless, transsubstantive, and on the highest
level of principle. Nevertheless, the shifting ground of federal-state power
has always been tied to the consequences, not only for the growth of the
nation as a whole, but for the particular substantive areas and doctrines
whose development was perceived, at least by those influential enough to
be heard, as essential to that growth. 274
The perceived need for judicially imposed uniformity has also proved
to be closely tied, historically, to the perception of which institution-the
Court or Congress-is, as a practical matter and at the particular time in
history, more likely to achieve the desired end.275 In this regard, it is
271. See Richard Briffault, "What About the 'Ism'?" Normative and Formal Concerns in
Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1303 (1994) (discussing formal and functional
approaches); Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalism in Federalism Analysis, 13 GA.
ST. U. L. REv. 959 (1997) (arguing for a functional approach); Friedman, supra note 209 (calling
for a richer dialogue on the values underlying federalism).
272. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of
Article 111, 113 HARv. L. REv. 925, 970-75 (2000) (discussing federal courts' evolving
conception of their own cultural identity and their efforts to shape the scope of their jurisdiction
accordingly).
273. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 16.
274. See, for example, Purcell's discussions of commercial law, id. at 12-18, labor law, id. at
85-91, and civil rights law, id. at 262-65; see also Ann Althouse, Federalism, Untamed, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1207, 1209 (1994); and Wells, supra note 4, at 114, 118, discussing the Warren Court's
expansion of habeas corpus relief and the Rehnquist Court's narrowing of it. Though the decisions
were couched in terms of statutory construction, comity, and finality, both sets of decisions were
obviously aimed at reshaping the particular substantive area.
275. See PURCELL, supra note 1, at 4.
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instructive to recall Purcell's nuanced description of Brandeis's attitude
toward federalism and of his use of federalism in Erie.
Brandeis held a principled belief that the legislative branch was more
democratic than the judiciary, and this belief was itself in accord with his
Progressive ideals of decentralization, experimentation, and social reform.
Perhaps more fundamentally, his belief in legislative primacy was premised
on his pragmatic experience that the legislature was more likely to
effectuate the social goals, such as social efficiency and equality of access,
that he held dear. Brandeis historian Philippa Strum makes a similar point
when she notes the futility of asking whether Brandeis would have
maintained his belief in judicial restraint in a different age in which,
perhaps, he did not approve of the legislature's actions. As she says: "What
he would have done had he lived in another era is not germane because his
entire political thought, including his jurisprudence, grew out of his
experiences at a particular historical moment." 
276
Strum makes an important point. It is impossible to know what effect a
shift in the character of Congress and the Court would have had on the
application or evolution of Brandeis's principles, since no such shift
occurred during his lifetime. Of course his attitudes toward the institutions
were shaped by his perceptions of their character, their capabilities, and
how they comported with his conception of government. 77 And if the
character of the institutions shifted in Brandeis's lifetime, and he therefore
shifted branch affinities in service of his commitment to justice and
fairness, such a shift in allegiance would hardly make him unprincipled. A
shift in affinities could mean that he--quite reasonably-found the actual
character of the institutions more relevant to his decisionmaking than the
characteristics of an abstract model that existed out of time.27 It could also
mean that legislative primacy was, to him, a second-order principle. Neither
of these positions is unprincipled.
The current generation of legal scholars, in contrast, has witnessed a
marked shift in branch ideologies, upsetting timeless verities about the
essential nature of legislative and judicial power. Perhaps what legal
scholars are experiencing is another version of the liberal anxiety that the
process school faced after Brown: the anxiety about reconciling shifting
branch affinities with a nontemporal notion of the character of the
institutions. Hence the "hoist 'em on their own petard" arguments that
276. STRUM, supra note 32, at 89.
277. See Louis L. Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises,
80 HARV. L. REV. 986, 994 (1967) (concluding that it was proper for Brandeis, at least when no
clear national consensus could be ascertained, to "consult his own understanding of 'the ethos of
democracy"').
278. See Gordon, supra note 10, at 1026 (discussing what he calls "Cartesianism," the
construction of "highly simplified models of social reality for the sake of analytic rigor and
elegance").
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many find so satisfying to make but so ineffective in practice. Warren Court
activists have been assailed as hypocrites for failing to support Rehnquist
Court activism. Rehnquist Court activists likewise have been assailed for
abandoning the conservatism they championed during the Warren era.279
This attack begs the question.
Whether a shift in branch affinities is unprincipled depends on the
principles underlying it and whether others judge those principles
adequate."' Suppose, for example, that one's constitutional vision focuses
on promoting governmental accountability, and on protecting the rights of
disfavored groups against the abuse of governmental power.2"' Arguably, in
many respects, the Warren Court proved itself generally able and willing to
advance that vision, whereas during the Rehnquist era Congress has proven
more able and willing to do so. A shift in branch affinities in this situation
is unprincipled only under the erroneous assumption that a commitment to
particular institutional roles must outlast major ideological changes in the
nature of those institutions, changes that cause them to cease protecting the
values underlying the original commitment. To the contrary, a functional
federalism is one that accommodates such shifts when necessary to achieve
its underlying goals. For this reason, it is not problematic to assume both
the sincerity of Brandeis's belief in federalism and the fact that he regarded
it as a value both consistent with and subordinate to his social goals.
Indeed, as I suggest above, it is more problematic to entertain a belief in a
federalism that requires no such supplementary justifications, and that
cannot be balanced against other basic values.
Brandeis grounded Erie in federalism for a complex host of reasons,282
which, like most reasoning, partook of emotional and moral commitments,
concerns with consequences on levels both abstract and concrete, and the
influence of values both pragmatic and lofty.283 Because his highest
principles were themselves deeply concerned with pragmatic consequences
and wary of abstract ideology,2 it seems neither necessary nor
descriptively accurate to distinguish his principles from his pragmatic ends.
Supreme Court Justices confronting novel and difficult issues are and must
279. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 24, at 747 (discussing the double-edged nature of accusations
of hypocrisy); Cole, supra note 24, at 6-7 (condemning conservatives on the current Court for
practicing the very activism they condemned in the Miranda, abortion, and exclusionary rule
cases).
280. Thomas Grey points out that "it is quite natural that the critique comes mainly from
those who lack sympathy with the results it rationalizes." GREY, supra note 10, at 16.
281. See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 2271,
2346-47 (1990).
282. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 95-191 passim.
283. See, e.g., Samuel H. Pillsbury, Harlan, Holmes, and the Passions of Justice, in THE
PASSIONS OF LAW 330, 330-62 (Susan Bandes ed., 2000) (discussing the emotional components
of the judicial passion for justice).
284. See STRUM, supra note 30, at 6.
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be influenced by their personal values and assumptions.2 5 The questions
are how they act on those values and how they attempt to reconcile them
with the requirements of their judicial role.
When, on occasion, Brandeis faced a conflict between his branch
affinities and his political and social goals, the latter tended to trump the
former. Did his willingness to treat branch affinities or other process values,
at times, as subservient to his Progressive goals make his commitment to
those process values cynical, situational, or unprincipled? This is one of the
core questions Purcell raises. He explores the question through two
comparisons. The first is between two of Justice Brandeis's own
jurisdictional rulings and his role in shaping them: Erie itself, and Willing v.
Chicago Auditorium Ass'n.286 The second comparison is between the
jurisprudence of Justice Brewer and that of Justice Brandeis. Though
Purcell never makes the comparative measure of the two jurists' adherence
to principle explicit, the issue is both unavoidable and important, and I
return to it below.
In his discussion of Willing, Purcell portrays Brandeis's role in the
debate about the proposed declaratory judgment act as problematic. The
declaratory judgment is a "final and binding adjudication of rights that
issue(s) without an accompanying order of execution." "2s Initially, concerns
were raised about whether, given the absence of an enforcement
mechanism, the declaratory judgment was an advisory opinion and thus
violated Article III's case and controversy requirement. Brandeis, according
to Purcell, regarded the declaratory judgment as a dangerous and disruptive
mechanism. It offended his belief that law ought to be made based on
concrete and narrow fact situations, not abstract and untested principles.
But, as Purcell tells it, Brandeis's most basic objection was to its potential
to derail Progressive legislative reforms before their reasonableness could
be demonstrated. In Willing, Brandeis held that the declaratory judgment
violated Article III. The factual context was unfortunate: His holding meant
that the legality of tearing down an auditorium would not be considered a
ripe issue until after the auditorium was torn down. His decision in the
Willing case, which ironically became the symbol for the need for the
Declaratory Judgment Act, 288 was intended both in content and in timing to
signal to Congress the Court's opinion that the then-pending bill was
unconstitutional. Purcell portrays Brandeis as using the Article III
285. See Bandes, supra note 147, at 366-68.
286. 277 U.S. 274 (1928).
287. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 125.
288. It was ironic not only because his decision backfired, but because the case became a
symbol of rigidity leading to unfairness. In this case, Brandeis did apparently jettison his concern
for fairness for the sake of his broader political agenda. Id. at 129.
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argument,28 9 as Justice (then Professor) Frankfurter charged, solely because
it was "the only intellectual device open to him." 290 Ultimately, Brandeis
found himself painted into a doctrinal comer, unable to admit the political
agenda driving his unnecessary use of the Article I constitutional
argument in his zeal to defeat the Declaratory Judgment Act. In this
episode, Purcell adjudges, Brandeis made improper use of jurisdictional
doctrine to achieve political goals.291
The comparison is with Brandeis's conduct in Erie itself. The Erie case
is not usually associated with judicial restraint. It overruled the ninety-year-
old Swift case without the benefit of briefs on the topic. The opinion
violated four of Brandeis's own canons of judicial restraint, which he had
set out less than two years earlier in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority.292 Purcell argues that Erie was, like Willing, animated by
political and social considerations, and was, like Willing, a product of
Brandeis's personal values and motives, but that, unlike Willing, it was
neither a strained and unsound opinion, nor an improper or pretextual
interpretation of the Constitution. Brandeis was moved by deep social,
political, and emotional commitments when he seized the opportunity to
overrule Swift and replace it with the Erie doctrine.293 But Purcell concludes
that in doing so, Brandeis acted both as a reasonable human being and as a
broad-visioned constitutional judge. The goals Erie allowed him to
achieve-improving the social efficiency and practical fairness of the
system, and bringing the government into proper constitutional balance-
were dear to his heart and his Progressive values. They were also fully
consistent with his vision of the Constitution, which was, in turn, deeply
intertwined with his emotional and political commitments.
The more difficult question, which Purcell never directly addresses, is
what distinguishes Brandeis from Brewer. Purcell's meticulous description
289. Specifically, Brandeis held that the request for a declaration of property rights prior to
the tearing down of the auditorium in issue would violate Article Il's requirement of a live case
or controversy. In Aetna Life Insurance v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937), the Court
ultimately held that declaratory judgments could, in the proper circumstances, meet the
requirements of Article Inl.
290. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 130.
291. Id. at 123-31. Perhaps more troubling was Brandeis's role in the campaign to abolish
diversity jurisdiction when he was a sitting judge. He spoke to congressmen about bills to restrict
jurisdiction, sent directives to (then-Professor) Frankfurter urging him to have his students publish
work on the topic, guided Frankfurter himself in writing and lobbying, even sending him money
to defray expenses, and tried to instigate specific legislation of his own. Id. at 144.
292. 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see PURCELL, supra note 1, at 132-
33 (explaining the four rules broken). Tony Freyer also suggests that Brandeis subordinated his
usual concern for the practical consequences of a newly minted doctrine to "a deeper urge to
establish a constitutional underpinning for a new judicial federalism," and that Erie was a
"triumph of theory over function." FREYER, supra note 49, at 153.
293. Brandeis wanted to seize the moment for several reasons, including his impending
retirement, his desire to pay his last respects to Justice Holmes, and his sense that the time was
ripe politically and jurisprudentially. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 133-40.
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of Brewer's jurisprudence certainly gives the impression that Brewer was
not particularly reflective about the differences between his own values and
assumptions, the values of his time, and any limitations the judicial role
might place on their implementation. Purcell also suggests that Brewer's
craftsmanship was adversely affected by this problem, and that a number of
Brewer's opinions were manipulative and fundamentally inconsistent.
However, Brandeis is also vulnerable to charges that he was manipulative
and inconsistent at times. More important, although it is surely preferable
that jurists be reflective, it is inescapable that to a great degree judges will
be a product of their time and that they will understand the values of that
time through the prism of their own values and assumptions.
It is arguable (and seems to be Purcell's argument, in part) that the
problem with Brewer's jurisprudence-unlike that of Brandeis-was that it
was self-aggrandizing.294 That is, in expanding the Article I power of the
judiciary, Brewer's jurisprudence insulated a broad swath of judicial
conduct from oversight by the political branches. But this argument works
only if one agrees with an abstract concept of legislative primacy apart from
its consequences for justice and fairness. Ultimately, any judgment of
Brewer's jurisprudence, or Brandeis's, must rest most heavily on those
consequences. Perhaps what made Brandeis's jurisprudence more
principled and more successful was that his underlying conception of
justice was more attractive than Brewer's. Perhaps, also, Brandeis kept his
focus on his underlying commitment to justice and on the real-world
consequences of decisionmaking for achieving justice, rather than on an
unthinking adherence to abstract subsidiary principles.
IV. CONCLUSION
Purcell's history, which approaches the past with meticulous respect for
its complexity, is rich with lessons for the present. It suggests, above all, the
need for a certain humility when we engage in debates over the nature of
timeless principles like the one true federalism. The question of what
constitutes a proper federalism cannot be definitively resolved. The
historical perspective suggests that judgment on the long-term acceptability
of any notion of federalism will be forged in the crucible of public opinion.
The true question is whether a particular jurisprudence is advancing the
values we have chosen as a society, by way of our "most deeply informed
judgments about pursuing individual freedom and the common good
through the instruments of popular government." 2 9'
294. See id. at 52 (discussing Brewer's jurisprudence and its tendency to expand federal
judicial power); id. at 165-66 (discussing Brandeis's jurisprudence and its tendency to curb
federal judicial power).
295. Id. at 305.
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The book also teaches that jurisdictional policy has long been
influenced by forces that are not well captured by the traditional depiction
of linear doctrinal development that remains consistent over time. This is a
key point for the study of jurisdiction. Scholars and jurists impoverish
jurisprudence when they insist that the evaluation of jurisdictional
principles transcends emotional and political commitments, historical
context, and substantive ends. This insistence impoverishes jurisprudence
not because it is possible to succeed at such an endeavor, but because such
success is neither possible nor desirable. Moreover, in pretending that
jurisdictional principles can float free of all human influences and
nonprocedural purposes, scholars drive those influences and purposes
underground, where they exist beyond the realm of democratic
accountability. 6 For, as Robert Cover says, "[t]he more opaque the
procedural principles are to discernible ends, the more their manipulation
becomes an arcane province of lawyers to be used in a purely strategic
manner." 
29 7
Purcell's Erie saga teaches that neutral principles were themselves a
purposeful and utilitarian creation of a particular historical time. It asks the
reader to consider whether that time has passed and to acknowledge that
principled jurisdictional policy was made before that time. If Justice
Brandeis "acted admirably and well as a constitutional judge," '298 perhaps,
then, jurisdictional rulings can be principled even when jurisdictional
policies are not treated as first principles, or immutable principles.
Brandeis's career suggests the possibility of engaging in a more pragmatic
and flexible jurisdictional jurisprudence,299 one that keeps a close watch on
the goals that the jurisdictional rules are meant to accomplish, determines
their shape by the values they are meant to protect, and is open to change
when those purposes are no longer being served.
296. See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REv. 227, 229 (1990) (making this
point in the context of the interpretation of Article III's case and controversy requirement).
297. Cover, supra note 213, at 639 n.1.
298. PURCELL, supra note 1, at 307.
299. As Purcell writes:
[L]egal analysis should systematically examine the dynamics of litigation practice,
consider more thoroughly the role of social inequalities in determining the results of
procedural and jurisdictional rules applied in the various de facto litigation processes
that mark different fields of practice, and seek continually to recraft those rules in order
to maximize the ability of litigants-particularly the weak, unsophisticated, and
practically disadvantaged-to secure practical justice.
Id. at 297.
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